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Bananas and Treaty-Making Powers:
Current Issues in the External Trade
Law of the European Union
Inger dsterdahM*
The European Union (EU) is more than an international or-
ganization but less than a State. As in a federal State, there is a
constant tug-of-war between the center, the Community, and its
constituent parts, the Member States. This tug-of-war includes
the area of the Community's foreign relations.
A large part of the Member States' relations with non-EU
countries is handled by the Community. Foreign trade is one
field in which the Community is particularly prominent at the
expense of individual Member States. Even in foreign trade,
however, some questions concerning the division of powers be-
tween the Community and the Member States arise. The con-
stant evolution of the Community's powers complicates these
issues. Over the years, the Community has gradually taken
over national competences in the area of foreign trade, often in
the face of the Member States' reluctance to relinquish their
powers.
The Community and its Member States have turned to the
constitutional court of the EU-the European Court of Justice
(ECJ)-to solve disputes involving the division of powers in the
area of foreign relations. Historically, the ECJ has sided with
the Community, enlarging the Community's powers through in-
terpretation of the founding treaties. At critical junctures in the
development of the Community's foreign economic relations, the
ECJ has led the way towards greater European integration.
Recently this trend has begun to change. Today there are
signs that the ECJ is becoming more inclined to promote the in-
terests of the Member States rather than those of the Commu-
nity. The Member States' visibility and their identities as
individual actors in international relations are in question; thus,
very sensitive aspects of sovereignty are at stake. In the field of
foreign relations, the Member States seem more reluctant than
* Senior Lecturer, Uppsala University Faculty of Law, Uppsala, Sweden.
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ever to relinquish power to the Community. At the same time,
the Community still strives for ever-growing powers. The ever-
increasing importance of international interaction on a global
scale compounds this tension. As a result, the EU's relations
with the surrounding world have become very complex, often
leaving the ECJ with the dubious task of trying to disentangle
them.
The ECJ has dealt with three recent cases involving the di-
vision of powers within the EU. These cases also concern the
EU's international relations, primarily those involving the
framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These cases
raise questions of principle concerning the external trade law of
the Community, illustrating how the ECJ has decided these is-
sues before and how it decides them now.
This article begins with a brief overview of the constitu-
tional structure of the EU. Parts II through IV will discuss the
separate cases in detail. The main issue in part II is division of
power among different Community institutions as to interna-
tional treaty-making. The treaty involved concerns cooperation
in the anti-trust field between the EU and the United States.
The case in Part III involves new rules on banana imports to the
EU and the relationship between EU law and the GATT. Part
IV discusses a case addressing the division of power as to treaty-
making between the Community and the Member States in view
of the agreement on the WTO and annexed agreements. The ar-
ticle concludes that, except for a temporary integrationist re-
lapse when the agricultural interests of the EC were at stake,
the ECJ's handling of the cases discussed here confirms that the
ECJ currently favors the Member States' interests over those of
the Community.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
The term "European Union" was launched in 1992, in con-
nection with the adoption of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU), better known as the Maastricht Treaty, after the Dutch
town where it was concluded.1 The EU as such, however, does
not have an international legal personality. For instance, the
EU cannot conclude international treaties. Although the name
1. TREATY ON EuRoPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [here-
inafter TEU].
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"European Union" may evoke the image of a more closely knit
organization than the "Community," from a formal or legal point
of view the TEU did little, if anything, to push forward Euro-
pean integration. For the time being, "European Union" is just a
name. It could perhaps be seen as the political guiding star of
the States that concluded the TEU and of the states that subse-
quently have acceded to the TEU. If nothing else, Europeans
will become accustomed to thinking in terms of a "Union" and
not only of a "Community."
There are three European Communities under the umbrella
of the EU, each based on a separate founding treaty. Each of
these communities has a separate international legal personal-
ity. The most important European Community is the former
European Economic Community (EEC) of 1958, which is now
simply called the European Community (EC). The Treaty on the
European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) founded the EEC
in 1957.2 The EEC Treaty was amended at the same time the
TEU was adopted in 1992, changing the name of the European
Economic Community to the European Community (EC). Thus,
the founding treaty of the EC is the Treaty on the European
Community (EC Treaty).3 Except for an increase in the breadth
and depth of cooperation between the Member States under the
EEC Treaty, the two treaties are still largely identical. The
other two European Communities are the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC Treaty) of 19524 and the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) of 1958.5
International treaties may be concluded by all three Euro-
pean Communities-the EC, the ECSC and the Euratom-in ac-
cordance with the treaties by which these communities
themselves were established. This article will examine only
treaties concluded by the EC.
All three European Communities and the European Union
are served by the same institutional framework. The coopera-
tion in the areas covered by the TEU is essentially intergovern-
mental without any supranational traits. This includes a
common foreign and security policy and cooperation in the fields
2. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
3. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J.
(C224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
4. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr.
18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC TREATY].
5. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY CoMMUNITY,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter EURATOM TREATY].
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of justice and home affairs. The Community institutions serve
the governments, however, and are involved in various ways in
the strictly intergovernmental work. The cooperation within the
three European Communities is closer and basically
supranational.
The most important European institutions are the Council
of Ministers, the Commission, the directly elected European
Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. Comparing the
EU to a State, the Council of Ministers (the Council) is the legis-
lative branch of government, the Commission is the executive,
the Parliament is a co-legislator of considerably less importance
than the Council, and the ECJ, of course, is the judicial branch.
Sometimes decisions are taken by a majority of the members of
the Council, and sometimes have to be taken unanimously. The
supranational character of the cooperation is, of course, strong-
est when decisions are taken by a majority.
The Commission is an independent institution made up of
public officials who are supposed to work for the best interests of
the Community.6 The Council of Ministers, although also being
a Community institution, consists of representatives of the gov-
ernments of the Member States. Consequently, the Council of
Ministers is more open to national influences than the Commis-
sion.7 Therefore, what may seem to be a dispute in the treaty-
making field between the Council and the Commission may be,
in reality, a dispute between the Member States and the Com-
munity. The Member States can retain much of their sovereign
control via the Council of Ministers. However, if powers pass
from the Council to the Commission, the control of the Member
States diminishes correspondingly, or at least it should do so in
theory.
Since the Commission and the Council serve all three Euro-
pean Communities and the European Union, one should use the
precise name-the Commission, or the Council, "of the Euro-
pean Community", "of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity", "of the European Atomic Energy Community," or "of the
European Union"-depending on what issue is under discussion.
Since the entry into force of the TEU, however, the most com-
mon practice is to refer to all institutions as being "of the Euro-
pean Union," irrespective of the precise context of discussion and
even if this is sometimes technically incorrect.
6. EC TREATY art. 157.
7. Id. art. 146.
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Unfortunately, two of the cases discussed in this article con-
cern measures taken under the EEC Treaty rather than under
the EC Treaty. As a result, these cases address measures taken
by the Commission and the Council "of the European Economic
Community." Since there is not much difference between the
tasks of the institutions under the EEC Treaty and the EC
Treaty, respectively, I use the simpler terms "the Commission"
and "the Council." References to particular treaty articles, how-
ever, need to be more precise, and therefore discussion will con-
cern the EEC Treaty when measures have been taken under
this treaty and will refer to the EC Treaty when measures have
been taken under this later treaty.
The European Court of Justice functions as the constitu-
tional court of the European Communities.8 There are currently
fifteen Judges on the Court, which corresponds to the number of
Member States of the EU. One particularity about the Court
deserves mention. In addition to the Judges, the ECJ, on the
pattern of French courts, consists of a number of so-called Advo-
cates-General. Currently there are nine Advocates-General. An
Advocate-General is assigned to each case before the ECJ. The
Advocate-General, who possesses the same professional qualifi-
cations as a Judge, is supposed to be an independent servant of
fairness and justice who makes sure that all relevant factual
and legal aspects of the case are thoroughly examined. After his
or her investigation of the case, the Advocate-General proposes a
solution in the form of an "opinion," which is always attached to
the final judgment of the Court. The Advocate-General does not
participate in the actual decision of the case. By comparing the
opinion of the Advocate-General to the considerably more la-
conic decisions subsequently issued by the Judges, it is possible
to see alternative ways of reasoning. Since the judgments do not
contain separate opinions, it is also possible to see the opinion of
the Advocate-General as a form of separate opinion in the event
the Advocate-General reaches a conclusion different from that of
the Judges.
A final note on the constitutional structure of the EU is ap-
propriate. There are currently three European Communities
and one European Union. The three European Communities
will probably merge into one when the treaty establishing the
8. The ECJ does not have jurisdiction over matters dealt with under the
TEU unless the Council, prompted by any Member State or the Commission,
draws up conventions stipulating that the ECJ shall have jurisdiction. See
TEU, supra note 1, art. k.3(2)(c).
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European Coal and Steel Community expires in the year 2002.
The development towards a single Community is indicated by
the name change at Maastricht, from the Treaty on the Euro-
pean Economic Community to the Treaty on the European Com-
munity. This makes room for all three Communities under one
name. The EC Treaty is concluded "for an unlimited period" as
is the TEU.9 The next logical step from the point of view of Eu-
ropean integration would be to subsume the intergovernmental
European Union under the supranational decision-making pro-
cedures of the European Community, while keeping the name
"European Union" for the resulting supranational organization.
Whether this will happen remains to be seen. Even more uncer-
tain is the next logical step, the creation of a federal European
State, the United States of Europe.
II. FRANCE V. COMMISSION: THE COMMISSION'S
TREATY MAKING POWERS
A. INTRODUCTIONO THE CASE
The case of French Republic v. Commission of the European
Communities (France v. Commission)'° concerned an agreement
concluded on 23 September 1991 between the Commission of the
EC and the Government of the United States regarding the ap-
plication of their competition laws." Normally, treaties con-
cluded by the EC with non-EC countries or international
organizations are concluded by the Council of Ministers, the
principal treaty-making institution within the EC. In this case,
however, the Commission concluded the treaty. The Commis-
sion does have certain treaty-making powers under the EC
Treaty, but these powers are very restricted. To support its ac-
tion, the Commission invoked, inter alia, the argument that the
treaty in question should be regarded not as a regular interna-
tional treaty, but as an "administrative arrangement" which the
executive branch of government may conclude on its own.
France, among other Member States, opposed the Commission's
action and brought a complaint before the ECJ seeking annul-
ment of the decision by which the Commission concluded the
9. See TEU, supra note 1, art. Q; EURATOM TRATY art. 208.
10. Case C-327/91, French Republic v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3641
[hereinafter French Republic].
11. See generally Allard D. Ham, International Cooperation in the Anti-
Trust Field and in Particular the Agreement between the United States of
America and the Commission of the European Communities, 30 COMMON MKT.
L. REv. 571 (1993) (analyzing the contents of the agreement).
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agreement. On its face, the case concerned the division of
treaty-making competence between the Commission and the
Council.
A general issue underlying the case is the division of powers
between the Community and the Member States. The Member
States want as much power as possible to stay in the hands of
the Council, over which they retain much control. Conse-
quently, Member States object when the Commission tries to ac-
quire additional power at the Council's expense through
imaginative and expansive interpretations of the EC Treaty. In
particular, when the Commission pretends it is equivalent to the
executive of a State, the Member States object because the EU is
not a State and the Member States, at least for the time being,
abhor the thought of the EU ever becoming one.
France v. Commission revolves around Article 228 of the
EEC Treaty, which concerns procedures to be followed by the EC
when concluding international treaties. 12 The ECJ sided with
the Member States and found that the Commission lacked the
necessary competence to conclude the anti-trust treaty. The
Council subsequently reconcluded the EEC Treaty.13
B. INHERENT OR CONFERRED POWERS?
The most important question addressed in the case is
whether the Commission's powers to conclude treaties are inher-
ent or whether they are restricted to the very limited powers
explicitly conferred on the Commission by the EC Treaty. Ulti-
mately, the case turned on the crucial and persistent issue of
distribution of power between the Commission and the Council,
and behind the Council in the Member States.
Article 228 of the EC Treaty regulates treaty-making be-
tween the EC and non-EC countries and international organiza-
tions. 14 Under Article 228(2), the main rule is that treaties
12. The EC and the United States concluded their agreement under Article
228 of the EEC Treaty. Soon thereafter, the EEC Treaty was amended and
renamed the EC Treaty. In the process, Article 228 was amended, but not with
regard to the rules on the division of power between the Council and the Com-
mission. See EC TREATY art. 228(4).
13. 1995 O.J. (L 95) 47. Cf Eric Stein, External Relations of the European
Community: Structure and Process, 1 COLLECTIVE COURSE AcAD. EuR. L. 127,
164 (1990); Pieter J. Kuijper, The Conclusion and Implementation of the Uru-
guay Round Results by the European Community, 6 EuR. J. INT'L L. 222, 234
(1995) (discussing whether the Council's legal bases for its decision to conclude
the WTO Agreement conformed with the Court's decision).
14. EC TREATY art. 228.
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between the Community and third parties are negotiated by the
Commission but are concluded by the Council. The power of the
Council is subject to "the powers vested in the Commission
in this field" (emphasis added). 15 The explicit treaty-making
power of the Commission is limited to the powers flowing from
three sources. The first is the Commission's charge to maintain
appropriate relations with international organizations other
than the EC itself. The second is the power of the Commission,
according to the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of
the European Communities,' 6 to conclude agreements with non-
EC countries concerning recognition of laissez-passer for Com-
munity nationals. Finally, the Commission has the power to
conclude treaties in specified cases where the Council delegates
authority to the Commission in accordance with the EC Treaty
as amended at Maastricht. This amendment was made after
France v. Commission was brought before the ECJ. Before the
changes at Maastricht, the EEC Treaty did not mention the pos-
sibility that the Council might delegate treaty-making power to
the Commission.
Even after Maastricht, the treaty-making powers which
may be delegated to the Commission are very circumscribed.
According to Article 228(4), the Commission may only conclude
treaties amending former treaties concluded by the Council, and
only if the original treaties provide for this possiblity. In addi-
tion, the Council may attach further specific conditions to its au-
thorization of the Commission.17 In France v. Commission,
however, the Commission argued that the new wording of Arti-
cle 228 did not limit the Commission's already-vested powers to
conclude international agreements. According to the Commis-
sion, these powers reach considerably farther than the text of
the EC Treaty seems to suggest.
15. Id. art. 228(2).
16. Id. Protocol No. 7.
17. Id. art. 228(4). This circumscribed structure is reminiscent of the so-
called comitology surrounding the powers delegated by the Council to the Com-
mission to enact further legislation implementing more general legislation pre-
viously adopted by the Council. The possibility on the part of the Council to
delegate legislative powers to the Commission was inserted in Article 145 of the
EEC Treaty by the Single European Act of 1987 and it was retained in the EC
Treaty. See Council Decision 87/373, 1987 O.J. (L 197) 33 (laying down the
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commis-
sion). Comitology concerns the elaborate system of committees with different
formal capacities-advisory or more-by which the implementing legislation is
prepared. The Council decides what kind of committee is going to be used for
the preparation of each piece of implementing legislation.
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The EC Treaty exists in as many linguistic versions as there
are official languages in the EC/EW. The text is equally authori-
tative in each language.' In order to strengthen its argument,
the Commission invoked the French language version of Article
228(2) of the EC Treaty and argued that had the drafters of the
treaty really sought to limit the Commission's power to conclude
treaties, the French version of Article 228(2) would have con-
ferred power on the Council of Ministers to conclude treaties
"'[s]ous r6serve des comp6tences attribuges A la Commission'
and not '[s]ous reserve des comp6tences reconnues A la Commis-
sion.'" 19 Attributes, according to the Commission, would have a
meaning closer to "conferred" in English, whereas reconnues, ac-
cording to the Commission, would be closer to "inherent" in Eng-
lish. According to the English language version of Article
228(2), the Council exercises its power to conclude treaties
"[slubject to the powers vested in the Commission."20 Thus, in
the Commission's view, the formulation "vested in" should be in-
terpreted expansively and not restrictively, as the French Gov-
ernment argued. Interpreted expansively, "vested in," according
to the Commission, means that the Commission may derive its
power to conclude international agreements from sources other
than the actual text of the EC Treaty.2 '
Interpreting "vested in" expansively, as the Commission de-
sired, however, could be seen as conflicting with a principle of
fundamental importance to the entire organizational edifice of
the EC. This is the principle of enumerated powers of the insti-
tutions of the EC, as stated in the EC Treaty: "Each institution
shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this
Treaty."22 This statement suggests that the institutions of the
EC have only the powers that they explicitly have been given by
the Member States. Seen from the Member States' perspective,
this means that they do not lose more power than they explicitly
agree to give up. In other words, there are no a priori powers of
the institutions of the EC. One could also say that there are no
residual powers of the EC institutions. The Commission argued
18. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature, May
23, 1969, art. 33(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (when
a treaty is authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authori-
tative unless otherwise provided).
19. French Republic, supra note 10, T 30 (judgment) (emphasis in original)
(explaining that Article 228(2) remained intact after the Maastricht revisions of
the EEC Treaty).
20. EC T"RATY art. 228(2) (emphasis added).
21. French Republic, supra note 10, 31 (judgment).
22. EC TREATY art. 4(1).
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that there are such powers, however, and it preferred an inter-
pretation of the expression "the powers vested in the Commis-
sion" which comes closer to "inherent in" than "conferred upon"
the Commission.
Both the Advocate-General and the Court used Article 4(1)
of the EC Treaty to support the rejection of the Commission's
claim that its power to conclude treaties is "inherent" and not
"attributed."23 Prima facie, this seems to be a strong argument.
Article 4(1) clearly states that the Commission merely has the
powers that the Member States have conferred upon it. The
problem, however, is that even this article is open to different
interpretations, and it is unclear whether a restrictive one
should be chosen. "Conferred on it by this Treaty"24 is not an
absolute formula, since it is seldom evident exactly what "this
Treaty" says. The extent of the powers conferred upon the insti-
tutions depends upon how one construes the other articles in the
treaty. Article 4(1) becomes a function of interpretation of the
other articles, not the other way round.
Fighting for its alleged inherent powers under Article
228(2), the Commission supported in a number of ways its argu-
ment that the expression "the powers vested in the Commission"
should be extensively interpreted. The Commission referred to
Article 101 of the Euratom Treaty and claimed that, by analogy,
it should have the same power to conclude treaties under the EC
Treaty as it has under the Euratom Treaty. 25 According to Arti-
cle 101 of the latter, the Commission negotiates and concludes
international agreements and contracts, subject to the Council's
approval. In case of agreements or contracts whose implementa-
tion does not require action by the Council and which do not im-
pose financial burdens on the Community, the Commission
alone shall negotiate and conclude them.26 The only obligation
of the Commission vis-d-vis the Council in such circumstances is
that the Commission shall keep the Council informed of its
actions.
In France v. Commission, the Advocate-General flatly dis-
missed the Commission's argument based on analogy by point-
ing out that the procedure for concluding international
agreements is different under the Euratom Treaty than under
23. French Republic, supra note 10, 134 (opinion of the Advocate-General);
id. 1 34 (judgment).
24. EC TREATY art. 4(1).
25. French Republic, supra note 10, 125 (opinion of the Advocate-General).
26. EURATOM TREATY art. 101.
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the EEC Treaty; this makes reasoning by analogy between the
treaties all the more difficult.27 Also, the Advocate-General em-
phasized that the Euratom Treaty and the EEC Treaty were
signed on the same day (25 March 1957) and that it is no coinci-
dence that the powers of the Commission-were laid down differ-
ently in the two agreements. 28 Because the corresponding
provisions are formulated differently, according to the Advocate-
General and subsequently the Court, this shows that the draft-
ers of the two treaties did not want the Commission to have the
same powers under the EEC Treaty as under the Euratom
Treaty.29 The Advocate-General and the Court reasoned a con-
trario rather than by analogy, which, considering the cir-
cumstances, seems more reasonable than the Commission's
approach.
The Court has applied interpretation by analogy, however,
to another difference between the wording of Article 101 of the
Euratom Treaty and Article 228 of the EC Treaty. I will return
to this point later on. For the moment, suffice it to note that
apparently the Court sometimes applies reasoning by analogy
and sometimes applies reasoning a contrario to the same Arti-
cles in the EC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty. When the Court
applies a contrario interpretation, it supports its distinction be-
tween the EC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty by arguing that,
since the treaties were signed simultaneously, any difference be-
tween them must be intended. Presumably this should hold
true for all differences and not just some differences. Neverthe-
less, the Court changes between reasoning a contrario and rea-
soning by analogy, depending on the case.
It is important to note that, in France v. Commission, the
Commission drew a line between "ordinary international agree-
ments," on the one hand and "administrative arrangements" on
the other. The Commission considered itself vested with the
power to conclude "administrative agreements."30 Both the Ad-
vocate-General and the Court concluded that the agreement in
question is an international agreement tout court as defined
under international law. Despite its formal designation, this
"administrative agreement" is an international agreement
27. French Republic, supra note 10, 26 (opinion of the Advocate-General).
28. Id.
29. Id.; id. 38-39 (judgment); cf T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 168 (1994) (comparing the application procedures
under Article 103 of the Euratom Treaty and Article 228 of the EC Treaty).
30. French Republic, supra note 10, 17 (opinion of the Advocate-General).
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under international law.31 So far as international law is con-
cerned, international agreements are either legally binding or
they are not. International law does not recognize multiple cate-
gories of binding international agreements. The Commission
probably does not dispute this particular point. However, the
Commission was of the opinion that it was vested with a power
to conclude legally binding international agreements, a power
which went further than the powers explicity granted the Com-
mission under the EC Treaty. This was especially the case for
agreements of an administrative nature.
The Commission's most important argument that its treaty-
making powers are "inherent" rather than "conferred upon" it
was reference to past practice. The Commission referred to a
large number of international agreements, either administrative
or technical in nature, which it had concluded without protest
either from the Council or Member States. 32 The Commission
inferred from this silence that its powers to conclude interna-
tional agreements had been extended in relation to the text of
Article 228 of the EEC Treaty.3 3 This is not an unreasonable
argument. Treaties are often amended by practice. The Charter
of the United Nations, for instance, a treaty which is at the same
time the constituent document of an international organization,
has been amended on several points through practice. 34
The Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties al-
lows "[any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its in-
terpretation."3 5 Treaty interpretation should take this into ac-
31. Id. ! 22 (opinion of the Advocate-General); id. 25 (judgment); see also
Vienna Convention of 1986 on the Law of Treaties between States and Interna-
tional Organizations or between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 25
I.L.M. 543, 545-56 (defining an international treaty as "an international agree-
ment governed by international law and concluded in written form: between
one or more States and one or more international organizations; or between
international organizations... whatever its particular designation"). The ECJ
referred to this Article even though the Convention has not yet entered into
force because of an insufficient number of ratifications. Cf Vienna Convention,
supra note 18, art. 2(1Xa) (defining a treaty as "an international agreement
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law
... whatever its particular designation).
32. French Republic, supra note 10, ! 28 (opinion of the Advocate-General).
33. Id.
34. Interpretation of the EC Treaty has generally been more progressive
than the interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations because the EC
Treaty contains broader goals. It is also probably true that greater homogene-
ity among the countries comprising the EU makes it easier to go beyond the
actual text of the founding treaty.
35. Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art. 31(3)(b).
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count. At first glance, this rule would seem to support the
Commission's argument concerning extension of its treaty-mak-
ing powers beyond the text of the EC Treaty. The Commission
has in fact concluded international agreements, albeit of a tech-
nical or administrative nature, in a number of cases. This prac-
tice has met with no protests which could detract from the legal
significance of the agreements.
Probably with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties in mind, the Advocate-General began his
counter-argument by stating that it was uncertain whether the
Council of Ministers and the Member States of the EU had actu-
ally been aware of the practice of the Commission. As a conse-
quence, it was not clear whether the Council and the Member
States had consciously tolerated the Commission's exercise of
treaty-making powers.3 6 In any event, both the Council and the
Member States failed to react to the agreements. At this crucial
stage of the argument, the Advocate-General could have in-
ferred the consent of the Council of Ministers and the Member
States from their silence. He chose not to, however, and one can
only speculate as to the reasons behind this choice.
As the Advocate-General himself pointed out further on in
his opinion, an important issue involved is the balance of power
between the Commission and the Council of Ministers. 37 An is-
sue at least as important, but not mentioned by the Advocate-
General, is the balance of power between the Member States
and the Community. The Advocate-General referred to a previ-
ous judgment of the ECJ in which the Court stated that "a mere
practice [on the part of the Council as it were] cannot derogate
from the rules laid down in the Treaty."38 In a way this settled
the question, but in a surprisingly rigid manner. The ECJ in
France v. Commission repeated this position and thereby con-
firmed the opinion of the Advocate-General. 39
The Advocate-General's comment is surprising in its rigid-
ity: "[Any other solution would be tantamount to acknowledging
that an infringement of the rules of the Treaty acquires legiti-
macy only because it is repeated!"40 Why would it be wrong to
acknowledge that an infringement of the Treaty acquires legiti-
36. French Republic, supra note 10, 1 29 (opinion of the Advocate-Gen-
eral).
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Case 68/86, United Kingdom v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 855,
24).
39. French Republic, supra note 10, 1 36 (judgment).
40. Id. 29 (opinion of the Advocate-General).
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macy when it is repeated? This is a normal way of amending, or
at least interpreting through practice, the EC Treaty or any
other treaty. It is also a means by which new international cus-
tomary rules are created; old rules are overridden by new prac-
tices. The crucial missing link, according to the reasoning of the
Advocate-General, was the opinio juris of the Member States.
Opiniojuris means the conviction by the member States that the
practice is binding as of law. Rules of customary international
law are made up of State practice plus a recognition by States
that they are conforming to a legal obligation-"a general prac-
tice accepted as law."41 The assumption that the action lacks
opiniojuris makes the reasoning of the Advocate-General logical
from a traditional point of view, but his argument remains rigid
and formalistic.
The ECJ did not comment on the statement by the Advo-
cate-General relating to whether an infringement of the EC
Treaty would acquire legitimacy through repetition. The ECJ
did not have to comment on this because it had already stated
that a practice cannot override the provisions of the EC Treaty.
The ECJ generally does not say more than is absolutely neces-
sary to solve the case before it.
The Commission and the Council, however, have obviously
played a central role in filling gaps in the EC Treaty's rather
general formulation. Whether a practice is labelled "derogation
from" or "interpretation of" a treaty text seems to be a question
of degree rather than a difference in kind. In the particular case
of the division of treaty-making powers between the Council and
the Commission, the rule is relatively clear. In contrast to other
parts of the EC Treaty, one can say with relative certainty that
one interpretation is right and one is wrong, strictly according to
the wording of Article 228. This also holds true after the amend-
ments of the EEC Treaty after Maastricht, even though these
somewhat extended the Commission's powers. This is not to
say, however, as did the Advocate-General, that "it is not possi-
ble to interpret Article 228" in the way the Commission did in
France v. Commission-empowering the Commission to con-
clude international agreements independently.42 In treaty in-
41. 1945 I.C.J. art. 38(1)(b); see also North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v.
Den., Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (discussing the requirements for establishing a
new rule of customary international law).
42. French Republic, supra note 10, 30 (opinion of the Advocate-General)
(emphasis added).
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terpretation generally, nothing is impossible, and in particular
not as concerns the EC Treaty.
The Court's own practice illustrates the suppleness of the
EC Treaty. The Member States have been surprised many
times by the way the ECJ has creatively interpreted the
treaty.43 At times the Court has found things in the treaty
which are by no means obvious from the text. Implicitly,
through the Court's interpretation over the years, the Member
States acquired many more obligations through the membership
in the E(E)C than they realized when they signed the treaty. No
one would argue that the Court, through its case-law, has not
gone beyond the reach of the immediate text of the treaty. The
Court heretofore has not been cautious, has not been formalistic,
and has not held back the development of the Community for
the benefit of the Member States. This approach seems, how-
ever, to have changed in recent years.
Would anyone conclude that the Court has infringed the
rules of the EC Treaty and EEC Treaty through its expansive
manner of interpretation? In defence of the Court's and the Ad-
vocate-General's reasoning in France v. Commission, it can be
said that, in this particular case, there was a clearly formulated
rule which it was possible to violate. In other cases, the Court
has interpreted vaguely worded parts of the EC Treaty or has
invented rules which cannot be found in the text, but it has not
acted contrary to the text. In this case, if the Court accorded
treaty-making power to the Commission, it would have gone
against the text of the treaty. Such a decision is more serious
than inflating the text when there are no fixed contours of the
Member States' or the institutions' obligations. Here, this fur-
43. For cases concerning the nature of EC law, see Case 26/62, N.V. Al-
gemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos and Neder-
landse administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1 [hereinafter Van Gend &
Loos]; Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585; and Case 106/77,
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R.
629.
For cases concerning human rights in EC law, see Case 26/69, Erich
Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419; Case 11/70, Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr, 1970 E.C.R. 1125; and Case 4173, J. Nold,
Kohlen- und Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491.
For cases concerning the liability of a Member State for damage caused to
individuals by infringements of EC law for which it is responsible, see Joined
Cases 6 & 9/90, Andrea Francovich and Others v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357; and
Joined Cases 46 & 48/93, Brasserie du pLcheur SA v. Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land and Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029. In ad-
dition, the cases that are subsequently cited in this section and in section IV
illustrate the creative interpretation of the EC Treaty by the ECJ.
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ther interpretative step is impossible. The ECJ could have
taken this extra interpretative step in favor of the Commission,
thereby sanctioning a de facto amendment of the treaty which
would effect the Commission's practice.
In defense of the Court but not of the Advocate-General,
who seems unusually conservative in relation to the Commu-
nity, it can also be argued that the Court cannot act on its own
without a complaining party of some kind. Even if the Court has
not, in principle, accepted agreements which the Commission
has concluded over the years and which it invoked as law-mak-
ing practice in France v. Commission, the Court has not been
able to stop this practice earlier since neither the Council nor
the Member States have launched complaints. The Court voiced
its opinion when it was given the opportunity to do so. But the
fact that no one has complained about the agreements concluded
by the Commission can also be invoked in favor of the existence
of law-making practice which has amended the text of Article
228.
C. Is THE COMMSSION AN ExEcUTIrVE?
Although the agreement concluded by the Commission was
deemed a legally binding agreement for the Community, the Ad-
vocate-General nevertheless discussed whether the agreement
could be classified as an "administrative arrangement" which
the Commission had the right to conclude. Here the Advocate-
General made a significant statement, albeit obiter dictum. The
Court did not enter into this discussion at all but presumably
was of the same opinion as the Advocate-General; otherwise the
Court probably would have concluded that the Commission was
competent to conclude the EC-US agreement on cooperation in
the anti-trust field.
For the sake of completeness, the Advocate-General is ex-
pected to investigate all aspects of the case, even if he or she
does not agree with all the arguments raised. Therefore, in
France v. Commission, the Advocate-General addressed the
question whether the Commission after all does not have the
power to conclude "administrative arrangements." The Advo-
cate-General did this even though he was unlikely to agree with
the conclusion.
The Advocate-General compared the Commission to the ex-
ecutive of a State. When the Commission argued that it has the
power to conclude "administrative arrangements," it referred to
the practice followed by States whereby the Government gener-
[Vol. 6:473
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ally, according to national law, is allowed to conclude technical
and administrative agreements without having to seek the as-
sent of Parliament." This line of argument presupposed that
the Commission of the EU may indeed be equivalent to the exec-
utive within a State, a view which the Advocate-General vehe-
mently opposed. In his most significant statement, the
Advocate-General stated that it was impossible to apply the the-
ory on the normal functions of the executive to the Commission
because the Commission does not carry out "an independent and
general executive function" within the Community legal
system.45
This was an important statement of principle and a signifi-
cant choice of sides by the Advocate-General. The Advocate-
General's tendency toward rigidity can once again be noted in
the choice of words-that it is plainly impossible to apply the
theory. It would have been possible to take a more flexible
stand, one more favourable to the Commission and thereby to
the Community. Instead, the Advocate-General chose a restric-
tive interpretation of the E(E)C Treaty, upholding the status
quo or even rolling back some of the Commission's acquisition of
power. France v. Commission obviously actualized sensitive
political issues, but until it was decided, neither Advocates-Gen-
eral nor, more significantly, the Court had been afraid to chal-
lenge the Member States in the name of European
Community.46
D. PARALLEL INTERNAL AND ExTERNAL PowERs OF THE
COMMUNITY
Another important point taken up by the Advocate-General
and the Court was the issue of parallel internal and external
powers of the Community. The Commission argued that since it
had internal powers directly conferred on it by the EEC Treaty
and the EEC Council in the field of competition,47 it also had
44. French Republic, supra note 10, 9 32 (opinion of the Advocate-General).
45. Id. 33 (opinion of the Advocate-General); see also Philip Raworth, Too
Little, Too Late? Maastricht and the Goal of a European Federation, 32 ARcHV
DES VoLKEREcHTs 24 (1994) (analysis of the TEU from a federalist point of
view). Because the Advocate-General did not think that the Commission may
be regarded as the equivalent of an executive he did not enter into the further
question whether the power to conclude admini trative arrangements is inher-
ent in the function of the executive.
46. HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JusTicE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING (1986).
47. Under the EC Treaty and Council Regulation 17, the Commission alone
is empowered to ensure the application of the rules laid down in Article 85
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corresponding external powers. 48 In that case, as the Advocate-
General noted, Article 228 of the EEC Treaty-which regulates
who concludes treaties (the Council) and how-could no longer
be treated as an autonomous general provision governing the
conclusion of treaties. 49 Against this and in a less absolutist
manner, it could be argued that Article 228 could very well be
regarded as autonomously distributing the treaty-making power
between the Council and the Commission, but that certain ex-
ceptions to this fundamental rule have developed in practice.
The Court's case law on parallel internal and external pow-
ers of the Community is fairly clear. By means of a pro-Commu-
nity construction of the EC Treaty, the Court has found that in
areas where the Community is competent to legislate internally,
it is also implicitly competent to conclude treaties with third
countries or organizations. But as the Advocate-General rightly
pointed out, the ECJ's case law on parallel powers deals with the
issue of the power of the Community vis-d-vis the Member
States and not the allocation of power between the institutions
of the Community. 50 The power of the Community is one thing,
(prohibiting agreements between undertakings limiting competition) and Arti-
cle 86 (prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position on the European market).
EC TREATY art. 89; 1959-1962 O.J. Spac. ED. 87,89. Furthermore, the Commis-
sion alone is responsible for the application of Council Regulation 4064189, con-
cerning the control of concentrations between undertakings. 1990 O.J. (L 257)
14, 15.
48. French Republic, supra note 10, 36 (opinion of the Advocate-General).
49. Id. 37 (opinion of the Advocate-General); see also id. 28 (judgment).
50. Id. 1 35 (opinion of the Advocate-General); see also Case 22/70, Com-
mission v. Council 1971 E.C.R. 263 [hereinafter ERTA]; Joined Cases 3, 4 & 6/
76, Cornelis Kramer and Others 1976 E.C.R. 1279; and Opinion 1/76, 1977
E.C.R. 741 (Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying-Up Fund for In-
land Waterway Vessels). On the ERTA case in particular see John Temple
Lang, The ERTA Judgment and the Court's Case-law on Competence and Con-
flict, 1986 Y.B. EuR. L. 183.
The Member States and the Council have constantly tried to limit the
treaty-making powers of the Community. See HARTLEY, supra note 29, at 167-
68. The Court, in a highly controversial move, found that the Community had
implied powers to conclude international agreements in all areas where it had
internal legislative powers. But, as Hartley points out, the Court soon man-
aged, by a "step-by-step" approach, to settle its doctrine of parallel powers in
the minds of the Member States. Id., at 164 ("What seemed bold in 1971 had
been discarded as insufficient by 1977").
The Community has even concluded treaties under Article 235 of the EC
Treaty-which gives the Council the power to pass internal legislation or to
take appropriate measures, if "action by the Community should prove neces-
sary to attain.., one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has
not provided the necessary powers"-and, according to Hartley, the doctrine of
parallel powers applies in this situation. Id., at 165. No one has brought any
treaty concluded under Article 235 before the ECJ, but in its Opinion 1/94 of 15
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and the division of power between the Council and the Commis-
sion is quite another.
The Court in France v. Commission restricted itself to say-
ing precisely this, but the Advocate-General also argued that the
Commission's powers even in the field of competition are very
limited when compared with those of the Council. Therefore,
even if the fundamental rule in Article 228 about division of
powers is not regarded as autonomous, the Commission's exclu-
sive powers in the field of competition are virtually non-existent,
and since the Commission has no exclusive internal powers, it
has no external powers.51 Again, the Advocate-General's opin-
ion, which received the subsequent blessing of the Court, gave
the impression of wanting to minimize the significance of the
Commission, and thereby indirectly the Community, in the tug-
of-war between the Community and the Member States. As
noted above, the more power the Council retains, the more influ-
ence the Member States retain over the Community and vice
versa.
Considering the ECJ's elastic construction of the EC Treaty
concerning the implied treaty-making powers of the Commu-
nity, it is interesting to compare the restrictive attitude the ECJ
takes when interpreting Article 228 of the EC Treaty with Arti-
cle 101 of the Euratom Treaty regarding the treaty-making
power of the Commission under the respective treaties. Accord-
ing to Article 101 of the Euratom Treaty, the Commission alone
negotiates and concludes international agreements of lesser im-
portance. In France v. Commission, however, the ECJ refused to
extend the same powers to the Commission under Article 228(2)
of the EC Treaty. This can be compared with another section of
Article 228 concerning the treaty-making powers of the EC,
which the ECJ through its practice has extended to become
equivalent to the considerably wider ones conferred by the
Euratom Treaty. Thus, at least in practice, some parts of Article
228 have been applied by analogy with Article 101 of the
Euratom Treaty.
November 1994, (1994) ECR 1-5267, 89, the Court seems to confirm Hartley's
assumption that the doctrine of parallel powers applies also in relation to Arti-
cle 235. The doctrine on parallel powers can be compared with the absolutist
reasoning of the Court in France v. Commission on the subject of Article 4(1) of
the EC Treaty: "Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers con-
ferred on it by this Treaty." Obviously the doctrine of parallel powers has con-
siderably extended the scope of the Treaty.
51. French Republic, supra note 10, 38-39 (opinion of the Advocate-
General).
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Judging exclusively from the opening of Article 228 of the
EC Treaty, "[wihere this Treaty provides for the conclusion of
agreements.. .," the Community would only have treaty-making
powers where this is explicitly provided. Article 101 of the
Euratom Treaty, on the contrary, provides in general terms that
"[tihe Community may, within the limits of its powers and juris-
diction, enter into obligations by concluding agreements or con-
tracts with a third State... "52 The way the Court has
interpreted Article 228 with respect to the treaty-making pow-
ers of the EC, however, results in the powers of the Community
under the EC Treaty being as extensive as those under the
Euratom Treaty.53
Hartley comments on the difference between the EC Treaty
and the Euratom Treaty with respect to treaty-making and
draws the same conclusion as the Advocate-General and the
Court in France v. Commission, that since the two treaties were
drafted at the same time and in many instances contain identi-
cal provisions, any differences that may occur between the trea-
ties must be intended as such.54 It is interesting that,
concerning the treaty-making powers of the Community gener-
ally,55 the Court has departed significantly from the wording of
the EC Treaty in the direction of the Euratom Treaty. At the
same time, in France v. Commission, the Court bluntly refused
to apply reasoning by analogy between the two treaties concern-
ing the allocation of treaty-making powers between the Commis-
sion and the Council under Article 228(2). In France v.
Commission, both the Advocate-General and the Court argued
that the Euratom Treaty must be interpreted a contrario; the
differences between the treaties were intended and the will of
the drafters should be followed.
This is not a consistent approach, considering the Court's
previous elastic case law relating to Article 228. Why did the
Advocate-General, and even more importantly the ECJ, apply
different methods of interpretation to different parts of Article
228? Even though the Court has significantly expanded the
Community's power to conclude treaties, the Community's
treaty-making power remains in the hands of the Council, where
the Member States retain a large measure of control. In France
v. Commission, the question was whether the Court should go
52. EURATOM TREATY art. 101.
53. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
54. HARTLEY, supra note 29, at 168.
55. EC TREATY art. 228(1).
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one step further and transfer power to the Community in the
form of the Commission, which is outside the reach of the Mem-
ber States. But this probably was regarded politically as too
sensitive a step to be taken by the judiciary.56
III. GERMANY V. COUNCIL: BANANA IMPORTS TO THE
EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE
The case of Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the
European Union (the Banana Case)57 concerns the decision of
the Council in 1993 to establish a common organization of the
European market in bananas (the Banana Regulation).58 The
common organization of different agricultural markets within
the EC forms part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of
the EC. The CAP in its turn is one of the most important and
certainly the most costly of the common policies of the EC.59
The common organization of the internal EC market in bananas
presupposes among other things a common import regime from
third countries. Before the Banana Regulation, different EC
countries had different import regimes, depending on whether
they produced bananas themselves and on whether they had for-
mer colonies which produced bananas (the so-called ACP coun-
tries-African, Caribbean and Pacific). In France, Greece, Italy,
Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, the consumption was
covered either by bananas produced within the Community,
56. In a more recent case that concerned the Commission's, or the EC's
right to vote in the Food and Agricultural Organization, where the EC and the
EC Member States individually are members, the ECJ decided in favor of the
Commission's right to vote with respect to questions falling within the exclusive
competence of the EC. Case C-25/94 Commission v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1469
(Fisheries Convention).
57. Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4973 [hereinafter
Banana Case].
58. Council Regulation 404/93, 1993 O.J. (L 47) 1 [hereinafter Banana
Regulation].
59. The CAP makes up approximately 50 percent of the total EC budget.
Other common policies are the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) concerning
the external trade of the EC, the transport policy, the economic and monetary
policy, the regional policy, the social and educational policy, the consumer pro-
tection policy, the industrial policy, the policy on research and technological de-
velopment and the environmental policy. The common policies have become
more and more numerous as the EC Member States become more and more
integrated.
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including overseas regions,60 or by imports from the ACP
countries.
Germany traditionally had the most liberal import regime
of all the EC Member States. In practice, an unlimited amount
of bananas could be imported into Germany duty free, regard-
less of source.61 Germany imported its bananas mostly from
Latin America. When the common organization of the market in
bananas was established, the quantity of Latin American ba-
nanas that could be imported to the EC was circumscribed and,
especially in relation to Germany where traders had been able to
import bananas duty-free, the duty on imports was raised. A
system for the licensing of importers of "third country" bananas
into the EC, i.e. Latin American bananas, was also created
through the Banana Regulation. As a consequence of the licens-
ing system, thirty per cent of the market share of the traders
who had traditionally imported Latin American bananas was
transferred to those traders who had traditionally imported ba-
nanas from the ACP countries.
The new licensing system was particularly detrimental to
German importers, who traditionally had been the largest im-
porters of bananas from Latin America. Therefore it is no coinci-
dence that Germany challenged the Banana Regulation before
the ECJ. Belgium and the Netherlands, which also imported ba-
nanas mostly from Latin America, intervened in support of Ger-
many. It was also no coincidence that the UK, France, Greece,
Italy, Portugal, and Spain intervened in support of the Council.
Individual German import enterprises have also launched com-
plaints against the Banana Regulation before the ECJ.6 2
The Banana Case raises a number of legal issues. Critics
attacked the Banana Regulation both under EC law and under
the GATT. The ECJ held that the Banana Regulation did not
violate EC law. The most important issue was whether the new
licensing system for banana importers violated fundamental
60. For instance the Spanish Canary Islands; the Portuguese Madeira,
west of Africa; and the French departments, Guadeloupe and Martinique in the
Caribbean.
61. This was due to a special "Banana Protocol" for the benefit of Germany.
The Protocol was annexed to the early Implementing Convention on the Associ-
ation of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the Community, as pro-
vided for in Article 136 of the EEC Treaty. The Implementing Convention itself
expired in 1962, but the Protocol continued to be applied. The overseas coun-
tries and territories were the colonies of the Member States when the EEC
Treaty was concluded in 1957. Now these countries are referred to as the ACP
countries.
62. See infra note 123.
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economic rights, as defined under EC law, of the traditional im-
porters of "third country" bananas. The ECJ held that, although
the GATT is superior in principle to secondary legislation in the
form, for instance, of a Regulation, the legality of the Banana
Regulation nevertheless cannot be tested against the GATT be-
cause the text of the latter is not sufficiently precise and uncon-
ditional to allow such a test. This is in line with the ECJ's
previous case law relating to the GATT. The result in the Ba-
nana Case was that the ECJ never tried the issue of whether the
Banana Regulation infringed the GATT in substance. Thus, ac-
cording to the ECJ, there were no grounds for annulling the Ba-
nana Regulation, and the Court dismissed the German
application for annulment of the Regulation.
B. THE BANANA REGULATION
The Council adopted the Banana Regulation6 in February
1993. In May of 1993 Germany launched a complaint against
the Regulation, seeking a declaration that certain parts of it
were void. The Regulation instituted a quota system for the im-
portation to the EC of bananas from third countries and from
"non-traditional" ACP countries. 64 The quota was set at 2 mil-
lion tons. It was later to be augmented to 2.2 million tons
through the Framework Agreement on Banana Imports signed
in March 1994 between the EC on the one hand and Colombia,
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Venezuela on the other.65 Within
this quota, "non-traditional" ACP bananas would be imported
duty free while the third-country bananas would be subject to a
levy of 100 ECUs per ton.66 The levy for third-country bananas
was lowered to seventy-five ECUs per ton through the Frame-
work Agreement. 67 The Agreement, however, did not affect the
principal legal issues in the Banana Case, then pending before
the ECJ.
The Regulation was also the subject of panel proceedings
under the GATT agreement after having been challenged by the
same countries (plus Guatemala) who later concluded the
Framework Agreement with the EC. The GATT panel found in
63. Banana Regulation, supra note 58.
64. Id. Title IV (trade with third countries).
65. Costa Rica-Colombia-Dominican Republic-European Community-Nica-
ragua-Venezuela: Framework Agreement on Banana Imports, Mar. 29, 1994,
34 I.L.M. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Framework Agreement].
66. Banana Regulation, supra note 58, art. 18(1). One ECU (European
Currency Unit) equals approximately $1.30 (US).
67. Framework Agreement, supra note 65, art. VII.
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favor of the complainants on several points.68 Considering that
the EC market for imported bananas is the largest in the world,
a great deal was at stake for the banana producers in Latin
America (mostly U.S. multinational companies). The EC mar-
ket accounts for forty per cent of the international trade in
bananas.69
Therefore, as we have seen, different countries within the
EC had applied different rules to the importation of bananas.
Germany had the most liberal regime with unrestricted duty-
free market access for all bananas irrespective of origin. Other
Member States had rules which either favored their own produc-
tion or favored imports from the ACP countries. Although disfa-
vored by restrictive import regimes, the majority of bananas sold
within the EC were still imported from Latin America. 70 The
bananas from Latin America were both cheaper and of better
quality than Community or ACP bananas, creating what the
68. The GATT Panel Report was issued on 18 January 1994, but not
adopted. GATT Panel Report on the European Economic Community-Import
Regime for Bananas, Jan. 19, 1994, GATI Doc. DS 38/R (Feb. 11, 1994), 34
I.L.M. 177 (1995) [hereinafter Banana Report]. The GATT panel found that the
new specific duties levied on imports of third-country bananas (100 ECUs per
ton) were inconsistent with Article II of the GATT on tariff binding because
they were higher or potentially higher than the tariff concession granted by the
E(E)C for bananas; the preferential tariff rates on bananas accorded by the
E(E)C to ACP countries were inconsistent with the principle of the most-fa-
vored-nation treatment in Article I of the GATT; and the allocation of import
licences granting access to imports under the quota system was inconsistent
with Article Ill of the GATrs prohibition of internal legislation distorting com-
petition between domestic and imported products. The same five Latin Ameri-
can countries also instituted GATr proceedings against France, Italy, Portugal
and Spain individually, the latter allowing virtually no banana imports at all
before the adoption by the EC Council of the Banana Regulation. See Nancy L.
Perkins, Judgment of the Court in Germany v. Council, 34 I.L.M. 154, 156
(1995). The GAT panel established to deal with that complaint also found in
favor of the complainants. The panel held that the quantitative restrictions
maintained by these countries on imports of bananas were inconsistent with
Article XI:I of the GAT's prohibition of quantitative restrictions on imports.
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposals for a New Constitution for the European
Union: Building-Blocks for a Constitutional Theory and Constitutional Law of
the EU, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1123, 1164-65 (1995). Yet another panel was
established on May 8, 1996, under the agreement on the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO), to deal with the issue of the EC's banana importation regime, sub-
sequent to a complaint by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the
United States. WTO Communication by the DSB Chairman, European Com-
munities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Con-
stitution of the Panel Established at the Request of Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico and the United States, WT/DS 27/7 (June 7, 1996).
69. Perkins, supra note 68 at 156.
70. Id.
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ECJ termed "structural deficiencies" which affected the latter
two groups of producers. 71
The point of the Banana Regulation, in brief, was to estab-
lish a common market in bananas while at the same time pro-
tecting the importation of bananas from ACP countries. 72 The
protection which ACP bananas had already enjoyed under the
Lom6 IV Convention was retained.73 The Lom6 Convention is a
comprehensive agreement primarily on trade between the EC
and the ACP countries guaranteeing the ACP countries duty-
free imports into the EC, but covering also a wide range of other
areas of cooperation.74 The Banana Regulation also established
a system for compensating EC banana growers for any income
loss attributable to the Regulation.75 Indeed, the Community
institutions foresaw that, if a common market for bananas was
71. Banana Case, supra note 57, 5 (judgment).
72. Banana Regulation, supra note 58, 91 15-16 (preamble); id. art. 1.
"The Regulation is intended to ensure the disposal of Community production
and traditional ACP production, as stated by the ECJ." Id. 91 74.
The restriction of the right to import third-country bananas imposed
on the economic operators on the German market is inherent in the
establishment of a common organization of the market designed to en-
sure that the objectives of article 39 [concerning the CAP] of the [EC]
Treaty are safeguarded and that the Community's international obli-
gations under the Lom6 Convention are complied with. A common or-
ganization of the market had to be implemented while Community and
ACP bananas were not displaced from the entire common market fol-
lowing the disappearance of the protective barriers enabling them to be
disposed of with protection from competition from third-country
bananas.
Id. 91 82 (emphasis added).
73. Paragraph 15 of the Regulation's preamble states that the purpose of
opening a tariff quota is, among other things, "to ensure satisfactory marketing
of bananas produced within the Community and of products originating in the
ACP States within the framework of the Lom6 Convention Agreements." Non-
ACP third country imports "not falling within the tariff quota must be subject to
sufficiently high rates of duty to ensure that Community production and tradi-
tional ACP quantities are disposed of in acceptable conditions." Id. 91 16 (pre-
amble). The Fourth Lom6 Convention was signed in Lom6, Togo on December
15, 1989. Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783
(1990), 1991 O.J. (L 229) 1 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1991) [hereinafter Lom6
Convention]. The first Lom6 Convention was signed on February 28, 1975.
ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6, Feb. 28, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 604 (1976).
74. Environment; agricultural cooperation; food security and rural de-
velopment; development of fisheries; cooperation on commodities; industrial de-
velopment; manufacturing and processing; mining development; energy
development; enterprise development; development of services; cultural and so-
cial cooperation; and regional cooperation. Lom6 Convention, supra note 73.
75. Banana Regulation, supra note 58, art. XII.
[Since introduction of the market organization should not place produ-
cers in a worse situation than at present, and since it is likely to alter
the levels of prices on those markets, provision should be made for
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created without keeping some protection for Community and
ACP bananas, these bananas would disappear completely from
the market because they are not competetive. 76
C. AGRICULTURAL PoLICY VS. COMPETITION AND FREE TRADE
Through its complaint against the Banana Regulation, Ger-
many raised several fundamental legal issues. Germany ar-
gued, first of all, that the objectives of the Banana Regulation,
insofar as they concern safeguarding Community production
and maintaining income of Community producers, do not come
under Article 39 of the EEC Treaty, which deals specifically with
the objectives of the CAP.77 The Court pointed out that, in pur-
suing the different objectives of the CAP, the Community insti-
tutions may temporarily give any one of the objectives priority. 78
The Court added that in matters concerning the CAP, the Com-
munity legislature, i.e. the Council, enjoys broad discretion. 79
Furthermore, the aims of increasing productivity and ensuring a
fair standard of living for the agricultural community are ex-
pressly mentioned in Article 39 of the EEC Treaty. Therefore,
the Council's adoption of the Regulation did not infringe Article
39. The Court pointed out that neither does the Regulation con-
flict with two other pertinent objectives of the CAP set out in
Article 39, namely to stabilize the market and to assure the
availability of supplies.
Banana prices had risen dramatically in the German mar-
ket after the adoption of the Regulation. Germany argued that,
in allowing this to happen, the Banana Regulation conflicted
with yet another objective of the CAP-to ensure reasonable
prices for consumers. In response to Germany's argument, the
Court replied that this objective must be considered in the com-
mon market as a whole, and that some adjustment of prices
throughout the Community is inevitable in the context of creat-
ing a common organization of the market.8 0 The Court also reit-
compensation to cover the loss of income which may derive from imple-
mentation of the new system...
Id. 12 (preamble).
76. See supra note 72.
77. Banana Case, supra note 57, 46 (judgment). The objectives of the
CAP under Article 39 are to increase agricultural productivity, to ensure a fair
standard of living for the agricultural community, to stabilize markets, to as-
sure the availability of supplies, and to ensure that supplies reach consumers at
reasonable prices.
78. Id. 47 (judgment).
79. Id.
80. Id. 51 (judgment).
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erated its argument that the Community institutions may
temporarily give some of the objectives of Article 39 (safeguard-
ing Community production and maintaining the income of Com-
munity producers) priority over others (reasonable consumer
prices).81
Germany also argued that since the Banana Regulation im-
plies a development policy in favor of the ACP countries, it can-
not be based on provisions of the EEC Treaty concerning the
common agricultural policy, but "at most," must be based on Ar-
ticles 235 or 238 of the EC Treaty.8 2 Article 235 extends the
Council's powers beyond the express provisions of the EC Treaty
in the exceptional case where a particular decision which is not
explicitly provided for in the EC Treaty nevertheless needs to be
taken to attain one of the objectives of the Community. Article
238 provides the Community with the possibility of concluding
so called association agreements with third states or interna-
tional organizations "involving reciprocal rights and obligations,
common action and special procedures." Germany probably in-
voked Articles 235 and 238 because those articles require that
decisions of the Council are taken unanimously, whereas the de-
cision on the Banana Regulation was adopted by qualified ma-
jority.8 3 The Banana Regulation was adopted in accordance
with Article 43 of the EC Treaty which lays down the procedure
for the adoption of EC legislation in the field of agricultural pol-
icy, including the creation of common agricultural markets.
The Court said that Article 43 is the appropriate legal basis
for any EC legislation concerning the production and marketing
of agricultural products, even if the objectives of the legislation
are manifold and do not only include objectives of agricultural
policy.8 4 Furthermore, said the Court, the creation of a common
organization of the market requires the establishment of an im-
port regime if, as in the case of bananas, the internal and exter-
nal aspects of the common policy cannot be separated.8 5 The
Community institutions also have to take into account the inter-
81. Id.
82. Id. 53 (judgment). In the EC Treaty, after the Maastricht amend-
ments, there is now a special section dealing expressly with development coop-
eration. EC TREATY arts. 130u-130y.
83. The votes of the different Member States are weighted, but not to the
full extent of the difference in size and population of the different states. Thus,
the smaller states have more votes and the larger states have less votes than
they should have if the weighting is strictly proportional to the size of their
country and population.
84. Banana Regulation, supra note 58, 54.
85. Id. 55.
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national obligations of the Community under the Lom6 Conven-
tion when implementing internal policies.8 6 It is evident from
the Court's approach that, under the EC Treaty and the EEC
Treaty, the objective of supporting internal agricultural produc-
tion and guaranteeing the sales of internal agricultural products
on the common market is generally superior to any objective of
free trade with third countries. This is particularly true for
third countries not belonging to the privileged group of ACP
countries protected under the Lom6 Convention.8 7
Agricultural policy is also given priority over competition
policy, which otherwise constitutes one of the central pillars of
the European common market. In connection with a relatively
marginal complaint by Germany that certain aspects of the Ba-
nana Regulation violated the principle of free and undistorted
competition within the common market, the Court said that it is
true that the objective of undistorted competition is laid down in
Article 3 of the EEC Treaty, but so are other objectives, includ-
ing the establishment of a CAP.88 As the Court stated, both ele-
gantly and euphemistically, "[t]he authors of the Treaty were
aware that the simultaneous pursuit of those two objectives
might, at certain times and in certain circumstances, prove diffi-
cult."8 9 Therefore, Article 42 of the EEC Treaty provided that
the rules on competition shall apply to production and trade in
agricultural products only to the extent determined by the Coun-
cil within the CAP. So even if there is distortion of competition
in the agricultural sector, the distortion prevails until the Coun-
cil decides to pursue a different policy. Consequently, Ger-
many's complaint that the Banana Regulation distorted
competition in the banana market was practically irrelevant.
The agricultural policy is still a sacred-and mad-cow com-
pared with the other common market policies.
It should also be noted, however, that despite its relative
lack of weight in the agricultural sector, the ECJ remains the
ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of policy of the Commu-
86. Id. 1 56.
87. While the Council may adopt legislative measures under Article 130w
to promote the development and cooperation of the Community, the provisions
of Article 130w shall not affect cooperation with ACP countries in the frame-
work of the Lom6 Convention. The ACP countries retain their special position
vis-a-vis the EC.
88. Banana Case, supra note 57, It 58-59 (judgment). Article 3a also notes
that the economic policy of the EC is based on the principle of an open market
economy with free competition.
89. Id. 1 60 (judgment).
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nity institutions, regarding form as well as substance. Hypo-
thetically, the Court could declare that a certain policy choice
infringes the EC Treaty. A political choice could thus be de-
clared illegal, but as the Court itself emphasized, in matters con-
cerning the CAP in particular, the Community legislature
enjoys broad discretion.90
D. BREACH OF FuNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES?
This part of the Banana Case is interesting and important
from an EC legal perspective because it concerns possible viola-
tions of fundamental individual rights and fundamental general
principles of EC law. The fundamental rights and principles
which make up part of the EC law are not evident from the text
of the EC Treaty, but instead have been created by the ECJ in
its case law.
In addition to laying down the 2 million ton import quota-
which was later augmented to 2.2 million tons-the Banana
Regulation also establishes a system for licensing operators
within the EC to import bananas within the quota.91 The quota
applies to bananas imported from ACP countries not among the
traditional banana exporters to the EU, to imports from tradi-
tional ACP exporters of bananas above their traditional export
quantity, and to third-country bananas. Within the tariff quota,
as noted above, imports of third-country bananas are subject to
a levy of seventy-five ECUs per ton, whereas non-traditional
ACP bananas are imported duty-free. Above the quota, non-
traditional ACP bananas are subject to a levy of 750 ECUs per
ton and third-country bananas are subject to a levy of 850 ECUs
per ton.
The system for licensing operators established in the EC
also regulates imports. Sixty-six and a half percent of the quota
is allocated to operators who marketed third-country or non-
traditional ACP bananas (i.e. necessarily bananas from non-
traditional ACP exporting countries since the traditional ACP
exports of bananas to the EC have never reached the quantita-
tive limit where they would begin to be called "non-traditional").
Thirty percent is allocated to operators who marketed Commu-
nity or traditional ACP bananas; and the remaining three and a
half percent is allocated to operators in the EC who started mar-
keting bananas other than Community or traditional ACP ba-
90. Id. 47 (judgment).
91. Banana Regulation, supra note 58, art. XIX.
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nanas from 1992.92 The Regulation imposes no licensing or
other requirements on the marketing of bananas produced
within the EC including overseas dependencies.
In the Banana Case, Germany argued, firstly, that the sub-
division of the quota constituted unjustified discrimination
against traders in third-country bananas.93 Secondly, Germany
argued that the loss of market shares suffered by those opera-
tors constituted an infringement of several of their fundamental
economic rights and freedoms. 94 Thirdly, Germany argued that
the introduction of the quota was contrary to the principle of
proportionality.95  The principles of non-discrimination-or
equality if put in positive terms-and of proportionality are
principles fundamental to EC law.
Germany argued that the subdivision of the tariff quota in
favor of importers of Community or traditional ACP bananas
equalled a transfer to them of a thirty percent market share and
that the subdivision to the detriment of the class of operators
trading in third-country bananas, without any justification, con-
stituted discrimination contrary to the EEC Treaty.96 Through
its earlier case law, the ECJ had specified that the principle of
equality means that "comparable situations are not treated in a
different manner unless the difference in treatment is objec-
tively justified."97 In the Banana Case, the Court cited Article
40(3) of the EEC Treaty, which states that the means used to
achieve the common organization of agricultural markets must
"exclude any discrimination between producers or consumers"
within the EC.98 The Court pointed out that the common organ-
ization of the banana market covered economic operators who
are neither producers nor consumers, but the Court stated in the
Banana Case that the prohibition of discrimination also covered
other categories of economic operators who are subject to a com-
mon organization of a market. 99
92. Id.
93. Banana Case, supra note 57, 1 64 (judgment).
94. Id. The principle of proportionality was developed in the case law of
the ECJ and eventually inserted in the text of the EC Treaty at Maastricht:
"Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve
the objectives of this Treaty." EC TREATY art. 3b.
95. Banana Case, supra note 57, 1 64 (judgment).
96. Id. 1 65 (judgment).
97. Id. 1 67 (judgment) (referring to earlier cases where the question of
discrimination arose in the context of agricultural policy).
98. Id. 1 66 (judgment).
99. Id. 1 68 (judgment).
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The subdivision of the import quota as one means to achieve
the common organization of the EC market in bananas con-
cerned neither the banana growers nor the consumers, but the
traders who import and distribute bananas to the local retailers
in Europe. Thus, the ECJ stated that this kind of economic op-
erator was also protected by the prohibition of discrimination in
Article 40(3) of the EEC Treaty even though the Article explic-
itly mentions only producers and consumers.
Discrimination occurs when comparable situations are
treated differently and therefore the Court inquired whether
this was so as a consequence of the Banana Regulation. The
Court analyzed the situation prior to the Regulation and ob-
served that within the EC there were open, national markets-
the German market being the most open, where importers were
even exempt from customs duties-and protected national mar-
kets.100 In the protected national markets, economic operators
marketing Community and traditional ACP bananas, in the
words of the Court, were ensured the possibility of disposing of
their products without being exposed to competition from suppli-
ers of more competitive third-country bananas.10 1 In somewhat
circular reasoning, the court concluded that, because economic
operators holding the tariff quotas were not comparable before
the Banana Regulation, the fact that they were in different situ-
ations after adoption of the Banana Regulation could not consti-
tute a breach of the principle of non-discrimination.10 2
However, any differences that existed before the Banana Regu-
lation still cannot justify any difference in effects on these
groups of operators introduced by the Banana Regulation itself.
The Court conceded that the two categories of operators on
the EC market had been affected differently by the Regulation.
Operators who used to market third-country bananas now found
their import possibilities at sixty-six and a half percent of the
tariff quota, whereas those who formerly marketed Community
and ACP bananas were permitted to import up to thirty percent
of the tariff quota.' 0 3 In the Court's view, this did not constitute
discrimination. It seems more reasonable, however, to adopt the
argument of Ulrich Everling, a former Judge of the ECJ who is
critical of the Banana Case decision, that the introduction of a
quota only for imports of third-country bananas was acceptable,
100. Id. 71 (judgment).
101. Id.
102. Id. 72 (judgment).
103. Id. 73 (judgment); see also Banana Regulation, supra note 58, art. 19.
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but that the internal repartition of the quota was not. Everling
argues that, in comparison with the usual criteria for allowing
access to import quotas under equal conditions, reserving a high
percentage of the quota to operators who have had no relation to
third-country imports in the past obviously constitutes discrimi-
natory treatment. 10 4
It should be noted that, under the Banana Regulation, es-
tablished operators may transfer their licenses to each other. 10 5
Most transfers will take place from operators traditionally mar-
keting ACP bananas to operators traditionally marketing third-
country bananas, who want their market back. The latter cate-
gory of operators will have to pay for the licenses, of course, so
any transfers will function as indirect subsidies from the opera-
tors marketing third-country bananas to the operators market-
ing Community and ACP bananas.10 6 This is in line with the
Banana Regulation's objective to support ACP and Community
banana production, 10 7 which as the Court says, is "a means in-
tended to contribute to the competitiveness of operators market-
ing Community and ACP bananas." 08
Alternatively, operators marketing the less competitive
Community and ACP bananas will now get the opportunity to
earn money from the competitive Latin American bananas. It is
more likely, however, that the Community and ACP operators
will sell their licences to the third-country operators, because
the trade in bananas is based on long-term relationships be-
tween exporters and importers, including considerable economic
investment, and therefore it is difficult for new operators to
enter the market. 10 9 In any case, the Community and ACP op-
erators will profit from the subdivision of the tariff quota,
whereas the operators marketing third-country bananas will
lose from it, just as Germany argues.
In response to the German argument that the subdivision of
the tariff quota constitutes discrimination against the traders in
third-country bananas, the ECJ also said that the subdivision of
104. Ulrich Everling, Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas Judgment
of the Court of Justice and National Courts, 33 COMMON MKr. L. REV. 401, 415
(1996).
105. Banana Regulation, supra note 58, art. 20.
106. This fact is also recognized by the ECJ. Banana Case, supra note 57,
86 (judgment).
107. Banana Regulation, supra note 58, 15-16 (preamble).
108. Banana Case, supra note 57, 86 (judgment).
109. See Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207 (dis-
cussing the vertical integration of the banana trade and its effect on competi-
tion in the EC).
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the quota and the ensuing difference in treatment between the
two categories of operators is inherent in the objective of inte-
grating previously compartmentalized markets.110 Market inte-
gration is indeed and by definition an important element in the
creation of the common European market. The objective of mar-
ket integration makes itself particularly felt in the field of EC
competition law. The thought is that third-country bananas will
now be able to make their way into countries where mostly Com-
munity and ACP bananas were marketed before, thanks to the
protected national markets. Operators formerly marketing only
third-country bananas will also start importing ACP bananas to
compensate for their lost market share in third-country ba-
nanas."1 In the unlikely event that the operators traditionally
marketing Community and ACP bananas sell their third-coun-
try banana import licenses to the operators traditionally mar-
keting third-country bananas, it would seem that the objective
of market integration will come to nothing. In the end, the over-
riding objective of the Regulation seems to be to protect the
Community and ACP banana production.
Everling argues that the real objective of the repartition of
the quota for the benefit of the traditional traders in ACP/Com-
munity bananas was to obtain higher prices for third-country
bananas. 112 This is not the kind of objective justification which
would support the otherwise discriminatory difference in treat-
ment between third-country and ACP/Community operators." 3
It was apparent to everybody, Everling writes, that the utiliza-
tion of quotas in such capital intensive fields as banana imports,
requiring investments in the producing countries and in domes-
tic ports as well as in distribution networks, demanded long-
term relationships with the producers." 4 Since the transfer of
licences was allowed, it was clear to the Council and to the Com-
mission that the favored group of operators would sell their
110. Banana Case, supra note 57, 74 (judgment).
111. Id. 83 (judgment).
112. Everling, supra note 104, at 415. The Advocate-General in the Banana
Case stated that in his view, it was to be foreseen that prices on third-country
bananas would rise, among other "perceptible disturbances of trade in the mar-
kets which had hitherto been open." Banana Case, supra note 57, 83 (opinion
of the Advocate-General). The World Bank estimates that the Banana Regula-
tion costs EC consumers $2.3 billion (US) a year, of which only $300 million
(US) benefit ACP producers. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation of
the World Trading System through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, 6 EuR. J. INT'L L. 161, 169 (1995).
113. Everling, supra note 104, at 415.
114. Id.
1997] 505
6M;w. J GLoBAL TRADE
licences to operators whose traditional imports were drastically
cut. 11 Everling draws the conclusion that the allocation of the
quota was therefore not appropriate to integrate the market, but
"leads to a pure and arbitrary financial transfer from one group
of operators to another."116 Thus, in Everling's view, the Court
accepted a clear discrimination between operators under Article
40(3) of the EEC Treaty in the Banana Case.117
Germany also argued that by depriving operators who tradi-
tionally marketed third-country bananas of market shares, the
Regulation breached those operators' right to property, their
freedom to pursue their trade or business, and their acquired
rights. 118 Fundamental human rights and freedoms are not ex-
pressly part of EC law under the EC Treaty, but over the years
the ECJ has followed the lead of the Member States' constitu-
tions and the European Convention on Human Rights, 119 incor-
porating human rights into the body of EC law as general
principles of Community law. Since the EC is primarily an or-
ganization for economic cooperation, the human rights in ques-
tion have been primarily economic rights, among them the right
to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business. Pro-
tection of acquired rights, without being expressly stated in any
Bill of Rights or in the European Convention on Human Rights,
is a general principle of law found in several European legal
systems.
In the Banana Case, the Court pointed out, however, that
the general principles of Community law are not absolute, but
"must be viewed in relation to their social function." 20 Consid-
ering the strong position of the CAP within the EC, we can al-
ready guess what the conclusion of the Court was in relation to
the fundamental rights and freedoms in this case. The exercise
of the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or
profession may be restricted, said the Court, "particularly in the
context of a common organization of a market, provided that
those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general inter-
est pursued by the Community and do not constitute a dispro-
portionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Banana Case, supra note 57, 64, 77 (judgment).
119. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (adopted within the framework of the
Council of Europe).
120. Banana Case, supra note 57, 1 78 (judgment).
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substance of the rights guarantee."121 Judging from this state-
ment, it is obvious that there is plenty of room for restrictions of
fundamental rights and freedoms in the event they conflict with
the the CAP.
The Court's response to the German complaint was that the
right to property of traders in third-country bananas was not
called into question by the introduction of the tariff quota and
the rules for its subdivision. 122 The Court stated that no eco-
nomic operator can claim a right to property in a market share,
since such a market share constitutes only a momentary eco-
nomic position exposed to the risks of changing circum-
stances.123 Consequently, it would seem that, in the name of the
CAP and the common organization of agricultural markets, the
EC legislature may reshuffle market shares as it wishes without
infringing the right of property. 124
Concerning the acquired rights and legitimate expectations
of third-country banana operators, the Court said, in a some-
what circular way, that no economic operator can legitimately
expect that an existing situation will be maintained if it is capa-
ble of being altered by decisions taken by Community institu-
tions within the limits of their discretionary power.' 25 This is
especially true if the existing situation is contrary to the rules of
the common market.' 26 The Court implied that the existing ba-
nana market was contrary to the CAP. 127 The point is, though,
that the limits of the Community institutions' discretionary
power are not clear and are ultimately decided by the ECJ itself.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. 79 (judgment).
123. Id. However, the relevant property of the banana importers is not mar-
ket share but the return on investments made in the producing countries and in
domestic ports and distribution networks. Everling, supra note 104, at 416.
Four proceedings have been launched before the ECJ in which German courts
have presented preliminary questions concerning import enterprises which
claim to risk bankruptcy because of the reduction of the quota for traditional
dealers in third-country bananas. Case C-68/95, T. Port GmbH & Co. KG v.
Bundesanstalt ftir Landwirtschaft und Ernahrung, November 26, 1996 (on ifie
with the author) [hereinafter T. Port GmbH]; see 1995 O.J. (C-182/95) 12; 1996
O.J. (C-364/95 & C-365/95) 8, 9; Joined Cases C-466 & 465/93, Atlanta
Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH and Others v. Bundesamt fiir Erniihnmg und
Forstwirtschaft, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3761, 3802 (answering a request by a German
court for a preliminary ruling by restating its argument in the Banana Case).
124. 1995 O.J. (C-181/95) 12.
125. Banana Case, supra note 57, 80 (judgment).
126. T. Port GmbH, supra note 123.
127. Banana Case, supra note 57, 80 (judgment).
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The Court then went on to discuss the alleged infringement
of freedom to pursue a trade or business. The Court stated that
the introduction of the tariff quota and the machinery for subdi-
viding it did indeed alter the competitive position of economic
operators on the German market, particularly those who were
previously able to import third country bananas free of any tariff
restriction within an annually adjusted quota. 128 However, the
Court continued, "[it must be examined whether the restric-
tions introduced by the Regulation correspond to objectives of
general Community interest and do not impair the very sub-
stance of [the freedom to pursue a trade or business]." 129 With
our knowledge of the Court's reasoning in other aspects of this
case, we can guess what the result of this test will be.
The Court concluded that the financial advantages given
traders in Community and ACP bananas must be assessed
within the general framework of all the measures adopted by
the Council to ensure the disposal of Community and traditional
ACP products. 130 Here again, we have the unassailable superior
principle of protecting Community and ACP agricultural produc-
tion. It could be noted, however, that the interest of banana
growers in the Member States, including their overseas depen-
dencies,1 3 1 and in the ACP countries is promoted to a general
Community interest, whereas the interest of approximately 370
million consumers within the EC in purchasing bananas of the
highest quality at the lowest price is not recognized as a general
Community interest.
Germany also argued that the arrangements for banana
trade with third countries breached the fundamental principle
of proportionality, in that the objectives of supporting ACP pro-
ducers and guaranteeing the income of Community producers
could have been achieved by less revolutionary measures. 132
Germany argued that a more extensive system of aid for Com-
munity and ACP producers, "coupled with a system of levies on
imports of third-country bananas serving to finance that system
128. Id. 91 81 (judgment).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id. 1 86 (judgment).
131. Some growers are even encouraged to stop growing bananas "in certain
very small regions of the Community where conditions are particularly un-
suited to the production of bananas." Banana Regulation, supra note 58, 1 13
(preamble). "A single premium shall be granted to banana producers in the
Community who cease to produce bananas." Id. art. 13(1).
132. Banana Case, supra note 57, T 88 (judgment) (concerning the principle
of proportionality); see supra note 87.
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of aids, would have made it possible to achieve the objective
pursued."'133
Again the Court made the significant remark that the Com-
munity legislature, the Council, has a broad discretion in mat-
ters concerning the CAP.' 34 The Court said that the lawfulness
of a measure adopted in the sphere of agricultural policy "can be
affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having
regard to the objective which the competent institution is seek-
ing to pursue."13 5 The Council's assessment of the future effects
of its legislation is open to criticism "only if it appears manifestly
incorrect in light of the information available to it at the time of
the adoption of the rules in question."13 6 In other words, it is
practically impossible to successfully attack legislation adopted
by the Council in the sphere of agricultural policy. 137
It is the ECJ's task to review the legislation of the Council.
But the Court's review of agricultural policy, as the Court itself
pointed out, must be limited if the Council has to reconcile diver-
gent interests by making policy choices which are its responsi-
bility.' 38 In the case of the banana market, the Council had to
reconcile the conflicting interests of some Member States which
produce bananas and other Member States which do not pro-
duce bananas and were primarily concerned with ensuring sup-
plies on the best price terms.' 39 This is the whole problgmatique
of the CAP in a nutshell. The fact that the Banana Case goes to
the heart of the CAP is one of the reasons the case is of such
great interest and significance. So far, reconciling the objective
of protecting the Community's agricultural population, on the
one hand, and interests of consumers on the other, has generally
turned out to the benefit of the former and to the detriment of
the latter.
E. GATT AND EC LAw
One of the most important aspects of the Banana Case is
that it brings to the fore the conflict between GATT law and EC
133. Id. 93 (judgment).
134. Id. 89 (judgment).
135. Id. 90 (judgment) (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. "[Bly submitting the principle of proportionality to the discretion of the
institutions, the Cour... grants them a carte blanche and reduces judicial con-
trol to a minimum. This is particularly dangerous with regard to human
rights." Everling, supra note 104, at 419.
138. Banana Case, supra note 57, 91 (judgment).
139. Id. 92 (judgment).
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law. Should the ECJ try the legality of EC acts not only in rela-
tion to the EC Treaty and the EEC Treaty, but also in relation to
the GATT agreement?
The EC was not a formal party to the GATT agreement,
whereas the individual EC Member States were. But as the
competence of the Member States in foreign trade was trans-
ferred to the Community due to the Common Commercial Policy
(CCP) laid down in the EEC Treaty, the Community began exer-
cising a de facto membership of the GATT in place of the EC
Member States. 140 In time, only the Community was competent
to deal with matters falling under the GATT. The substitution
of the EC for the Member States in the GATT without any for-
mal amendments of the GATT agreement has been recognized
both within the EC141 and by the other members of the
GATT.142
The ECJ has found, in earlier judgments, that the GATT
binds the EC and thereby that the provisions of the GATT form
part of the EC legal system.1 43 This does not necessarily mean,
however, that the provisions of the GATT will be applied in con-
creto in a particular case. Whether or not the GATT provisions
will be applied-whether they have direct effect-depends on the
degree of precision of the part of the GATT agreement which is
in issue. The ECJ has stated in a famous formula that the
spirit, the general scheme, and the terms of GATT must first be
considered.' 44
140. Jorn Sack, The European Community's Membership of International
Organizations, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1227, 1237-38 (1995).
141. Joined Cases 31-24/72, Intl Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219 [hereinafter Int'l Fruit Co.].
142. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The EC as a GAT Member-Legal Conflicts
Between GATT Law and European Community Law, in THE EURoPEAN COMMU-
Nrry AND GATr 23, 37-39 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986).
143. See Int'l Fruit Co., supra note 141; Case 38/75; Douaneagent der NV
Nederlandse Spoorwegen v. Inspecteur der invoerrechten en accijnzen, 1975
E.C.R. 1439; Case 266/81, Societa Italiana per l'Oleodotto Transalpino (SIOT) v.
Ministero delle Finanze, 1983 E.C.R. 731 [hereinafter SIOT]; Joined Cases 267
& 269/81, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. SocietA petrolifera Ital-
iana SpA (SPI), 1983 E.C.R. 801 [hereinafter SPI]; Joined Cases 290 & 291/81,
Compagnia Singer SpA and Geigy SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello
Stato, 1983 E.C.R. 847; Case 70/87, F~d6ration de l'industrie de l'huilerie de la
CEE (Fediol) v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 1781 [hereinafter Fediol]; Case C-69/
89, Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd. v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2069 [hereinafter
Nakajima].
144. Banana Case, supra note 57, 105. This formula was first stated in
relation to the GATT in International Fruit Company. Int'l Fruit Co., supra
note 141. Originally the test whether a rule had direct effect within EC law was
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According to the ECJ, the GATT is characterized by great
flexibility and conditionality. 145 Consequently, the Court has
determined that the provisions of the GATT agreement do not
have direct effect. That is, they cannot be invoked by an individ-
ual-physical or legal-before a court to challenge, for instance,
the lawfulness of a Community act.146 The fact that, in the Ba-
nana Case, the plaintiff was not an individual but a Member
State, did not change the reasoning of the Court.147 The GATT
is not precise and unconditional enough to be relied on to chal-
lenge Community legislation. 148
Only under very special circumstances would individuals or
Member States be able to challenge the lawfulness of commu-
nity legislation by invoking the GATT agreement.
[Ilt is only if the Community intended to implement a particular obli-
gation entered into within the framework of GATT, or if the Commu-
nity act expressly refers to specific provisions of GATT, that the Court
can review the lawfulness of the Community act in question from the
point of view of the GATT rules.
149
So, the result in the Banana Case was that Germany could not
invoke the provisions of the GATT to challenge the Banana
Regulation.
The ECJ's decision on this point has been severely criticized
by Michael Hahn and Gunnar Schuster, who argue that it is
wrong to place individuals and Member States on the same foot-
carried out by the EC in respect of an article in the E(E)C Treaty itself. Van
Gend & Loos, supra note 43.
145. Gerhard Bebr, Agreements Concluded by the Community and their Pos-
sible Direct Effect: From International Fruit Company to Kupferberg, 20 COM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 35, 45 (1983).
146. Banana Case, supra note 57, 125-151 (opinion of the Advocate-Gen-
eral); id. 106-109 (judgment). The cases referred to by the Court in this
context are: Intl Fruit Co., supra note 141; Case 9/73, Schliter v Hauptzollamt
Lrrach, 1973 E.C.R. 1135; SIOT, supra note 143; and SPI, supra note 143. See
also Gerhard Bebr, supra note 145; Jol Rideau, Les Accords Internationaux
dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautes Europeennes:
Rdflexions sur les Relations entre les Ordres Juridiques International, Com-
munautaire et Nationaux, 94 REVUE GPN9RALE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL PUB-
LIC 289, 291-418 (1990); Ernst-Uhich Petersmann, supra note 68, at 1167-69.
But see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Application of GATT by the Court of Justice
of the European Communities, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 397, 403-404 (1983)
(arguing that the GATT is indeed precise and unconditional enough to be taken
into consideration by the ECJ).
147. Nor does the fact that the case was brought directly before the ECJ and
did not reach the ECJ by way of a national court.
148. Banana Case, supra note 57, 1 109 (judgment).
149. Id. I 111 (judgment).
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ing to challenge Community legislation. 150 Individuals who
challenge a Community act are doing this in their own interest
only, even though such an action may incidentally also be of gen-
eral interest. Consequently, if individuals challenge the legality
of a Community act directly before the ECJ, which they may do
under special circumstances according to Article 173(4), they
have to show that the Community act affects them directly and
individually.' 5 '
The Member States, on the other hand, have an uncondi-
tional right according to Article 173(2) to turn to the ECJ to
challenge the legality of Community legislation, irrespective of
whether they have any particular interest in the Community act
in question. Hahn and Schuster argue that international agree-
ments concluded by the Community, including the GATT,' 5 2 are
part of Community law and are superior to the legislative acts
issued by the Community institutions, such as the Banana Reg-
ulation. Thus, the Member States should have the same uncon-
ditional access to the ECJ to challenge Community legislation
infringing the GATT as they have when challenging the legality
of Community legislation infringing the EC Treaty. 5 3 Hahn
and Schuster also argue that Article 173(2) of the EC Treaty is
the constitutional counterbalance to the democratic principle
which finds its expression in decision making by a qualified ma-
jority in the Council.' 54 Action under Article 173(2) is the only
instrument by which the Member States can defend themselves
against acts by the Community institutions which infringe upon
EC law.'5 5 All limitation of the right of access to the ECJ of the
Member States, Hahn and Schuster write, disturbs the institu-
tional equilibrium of the EU, to which the ECJ normally at-
150. See generally Michael J. Hahn & Gunnar Schuster, Le Droit des ,tats
Membres de se Prdvaloir en Justice d'un Accord Liant la Communaut4, 99 RE-
vuE GPi.RALE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PuBLic 367, 376-77 (1995) (claiming
that political considerations rather than legal inspired the ECJ); Robert E.
Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT in the Domestic Law of the United States, in
THE EtmoPAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 187, 195 226 (Meinhard Hill et al. eds.,
1986) (applying GATT principles within the United States).
151. Some individual enterprises have brought actions against Community
acts relating to GATT matters. Fediol, supra note 143; Nakajima, supra note
143.
152. The GATT was concluded by the EC Member States themselves but the
Community replaced the Member States de facto as a party to the GAIT after it
had taken over the Member States' competence in the field of foreign trade. See
supra note 141 and accompanying text.
153. Hahn & Schuster, supra note 150, at 371-72.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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taches great weight.156 Finally, Hahn and Schuster also point
out that the EC Member States can be held responsible under
international law on state responsibility for violations of inter-
national agreements concluded by the Community. As a result,
the Member States should have an unconditional right to turn to
the ECJ if and when they think that Community legislation in-
fringes an international agreement. 157
The somewhat perplexing result of the Banana Case is that
the ECJ found that the Banana Regulation did not infringe EC
law, including the GATT, whereas the GATT panel, as we saw
above, found that the Regulation infringed several GATT rules
and was therefore partly illegal from the GATT perspective. 158
There is no difference between the GATT and the EC Treaty
as far as their place in the hierarchy of international legal
norms is concerned. 15 9 They are both multilateral international
156. Id.
157. Id. at 372-73. Under Article 228(7) of the EC Treaty, agreements con-
cluded by the Community "shall be binding on the institutions of the Commu-
nity and on Member States." EC TREATY art. 228 (emphasis added).
158. Banana Report, supra note 68. When the ECJ delivered its judgment,
on October 5, 1994, the results of the deliberations of the GATT panel were
already known (as of January 18). Petersmann comments that the EC appar-
ently cannot disregard its international obligations under the Lomd Convention
but may disregard its worldwide GATT obligations. Petersmann, supra note
68, at 1169. Petersmann's sulphurous analysis of the conflict underlying the
Banana Regulation and the subsequent Banana Case is worth quoting at
length:
[M]ore important than the international conflict between GATT con-
tracting parties is the domestic conflict between, on the one side, the
general interest of EC consumers, tax-payers and EC traders in a lib-
eral GATT-consistent trade regime for less expensive, high quality im-
ports (e.g. "dollar bananas"); and, on the other side, the rent-seeking
group interests of import-competing EC producers of expensive, low-
quality products (e.g. EC bananas) in trade protection. No less impor-
tant is the... conflict between, on the one side, the general interest in
rule of law (including GATT law), especially by those EC Member
States which had liberal import regimes for bananas and had voted
against adoption of EEC Regulation No. 404193; and, on the other side,
the rent-seeking interests of those EC Member States which had voted
for the EEC Regulation in order to continue their long-standing but
wasteful trade protection of the more expensive "EC bananas" and
"ACP bananas" from their former colonies.
Id., at 1166-67.
159. See Generally Wolfram Karl, Conflicts Between Treaties, in ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 467,467-473 (1984) (concerning the horizon-
tal international legal system in general). See, e.g., MICHAEL AKEHuRST, A
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-40 (1987); OsCAR
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 66, 74-83 (1991);
MALcoLM N. SHAw, INTERNATIONAL LAw 98-100 (1991); I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-48 (1994).
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treaties. One could argue that since the GATT is global in scope
it would occupy a higher position in the international legal hier-
archy than the EC Treaty, which is merely regional. On the
other hand, the EC Treaty is more precise; it includes an elabo-
rate legal and institutional system and includes efficient mecha-
nisms for enforcement of its laws in the Member States.
The correct analysis remains, however, that the GATT and
the EC Treaty are of the same international normative value,
and that the arbiters of the two respective systems came to dif-
ferent conclusions as to the legality of the Banana Regulation.
There is no legal authority to settle the issue. Such a conflict
has to be settled by political means through negotiations and it
was apparently settled through the Framework Agreement on
Banana Imports concluded between the EC and the dissatisfied
Latin American banana exporters. 160 Germany's request for an
Advisory Opinion with the ECJ concerning the Framework
Agreement, 161 which turned out to be unsuccessful, will be
treated further at the end of Part V, since it concerns both the
Banana Case and the Opinion on the WTO. 162
IV. THE WTO OPINION-ADVISORY OPINION ON THE
EC'S TREATY-MAKING POWERS
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE
The agreement on the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and the agreements annexed thereto (the Multilateral Agree-
ments on the Trade in Goods, including the revised "GATT
1994," the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPs)) were concluded in 1993 at the end of the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 163 This com-
plex of agreements is more extensive than the former GATT,
and the creation of the WTO implies that the mode of coopera-
tion between the parties to the different agreements will become
more structured and more institutionalized. The creation of the
160. Framework Agreement, supra note 65.
161. Cf Opinion 3/94, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4577.
162. Germany has afterwards launched another action with the ECJ
against the decision of the Council to conclude the Framework Agreement.
1995 O.J. (C174) 3 (C-122/95). This second case has not yet been decided by the
Court.
163. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY RouND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
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WTO brought about many changes in the way the GATT and the
other treaties will be implemented.164
The issue of interest here is where the competence lay on
the European side to conclude the GATS and the TRIPs agree-
ment. Did the competence lie with the EC or did it lie with the
Member States themselves? If the competence lay with the EC,
what was the legal basis of that competence? These are the is-
sues dealt with by the ECJ in its Advisory Opinion on the WTO
(WTO: Opinion).165 According to Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty
"[t]he Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain
the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement
envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty."
Before the different agreements were concluded by the Council
on the part of the EC, or by the Member States, the Commission,
which held the view that the EC had exclusive competence to
conclude all the agreements, requested an Advisory Opinion
from the ECJ to solve this issue. 66
It was clear that the competence to conclude the revised
GATT and most of the other Multilateral Agreements on the
Trade in Goods lay with the Community under the CCP. We
have already seen in connection with the discussion of the GATT
law in the Banana Case that the EC, for all practical purposes,
had replaced the Member States as a party to the GATT. 167
Therefore the issue of who was competent to conclude the GATT
and the other agreements on trade in goods did not arise except
so far as agreements on trade in goods coming within the scope
of the ECSC Treaty or the Euratom Treaty were concerned. The
issue of treaty-making competence also arose with regard to ag-
ricultural products. These were relatively easy questions for the
ECJ to solve, as we will see below.
Much of the discussion in the WTO Opinion focused on Arti-
cle 113 of the EC Treaty. 68 Article 113 applies to trade in
goods. Paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 113 are particularly rele-
vant. According to paragraph 1, "[tlhe common commercial pol-
164. For instance, the system for the settlement of disputes between party
states was reformed and strengthened. Cf Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dis-
pute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of
the GAIT Dispute Settlement System Since 1948, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV.1157, 1157-1244 (1994).
165. Opinion 1/94, Opinion pursuant to Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty,
1994 E.C.R. 1-5267.
166. Currently, the EC concludes international treaties, not the EU, which
lacks international legal personality.
167. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
168. EC TREATY art. 113.
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icy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard
to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade
agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures to pro-
tect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or
subsidies." 169 And according to paragraph 4, the Council in ex-
ercising the powers conferred on it by Article 113 shall act by a
qualified majority. 170
These two paragraphs of Article 113 taken together thus
imply that the EC has the exclusive competence to conclude in-
ternational agreements in the sphere of trade in goods. When
the Council concludes such agreements, it is not dependent on
the acceptance of the representative of every Member State in
the Council of the agreement. Decisions to conclude an interna-
tional agreement may be taken by a qualified majority. This is
as close to supranationality as the EC Treaty comes so far.
Because of the ongoing struggle for power between the
Member States and the Community, the Member States are
afraid that more and more areas of international trade will be
brought under the umbrella of Article 113 of the EC Treaty and
thus be removed from their own national competence. The argu-
ment that goods coming within the scope of the ECSC Treaty or
the Euratom Treaty were not covered by the exclusive Commu-
nity competence deriving from Article 113 of the EC Treaty il-
lustrates the Member States' reluctance to relinquish more
power concerning trade in goods to the Community. The Mem-
ber States made the same argument with respect to agricultural
products and sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which were
also the subject of an agreement within the group of agreements
on the trade in goods. So, according to the Member States' argu-
ment, certain kinds of goods or certain policy areas related to the
trade in goods should not be included in the Community's com-
petence to conclude trade agreements.
The Member States' resistance is even stronger to the inclu-
sion of completely new sectors of international trade within the
exclusive Community competence under Article 113. These new
sectors include trade in services (GATS) or issues concerning
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs). It
can be noted that the Council of the EC sided with the Member
States against the Commission in the WTO case. 171 The Com-
mission argued, alternatively, that if the Community lacked
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. So did the European Parliament, incidentally.
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competence to conclude the GATS or the TRIPs agreement on
the basis of EC Treaty Article 113, it had competence, according
to the ECJ's own doctrine of implied treaty-making powers of
the Community, in fields where the Community is competent to
legislate internally. These include the competence to adopt EC
legislation, or where an international agreement is otherwise
necessary to achieve an internal Community objective. In cases
where an international agreement is necessary to achieve a
Community objective, the Community does not need to wait un-
til the corresponding internal legislation is adopted before exer-
cising exclusive external powers, but may instead conclude the
international agreement directly, whereby its external powers in
this field automatically become exclusive. 172
The way the ECJ solved all these issues has been aptly
characterized by one author as "effectuating the core-compe-
tences of the EC such as the CCP and at the same time limiting
the implied extension of the competences of the EC to the detri-
ment of the Member States."173 The ECJ found that under Arti-
cle 113 the Community was competent to conclude all the
agreements relating to the trade in goods. The Community did
not benefit from any implied treaty-making powers in the field of
GATS and TRIPs, however, according to the ECJ.
So far as the trade in services is concerned, the ECJ found
that the Community was exclusively competent under Article
113 of the EC Treaty to conclude the section of the GATS which
relates to one of the four modes of supply of services: cross-fron-
tier supplies not involving any movement of persons. 174 The
three remaining modes of supply of services-consumption
abroad, commercial presence, or the presence of natural persons
supplying the services-are not covered by the CCP. Thus the
ECJ found that some but not all international trade in services
should be subsumed under Article 113 of the EC Treaty. The
ECJ also found, however, that the Member States retained the
competence to conclude the remaining parts of the GATT and for
that reason the Court concluded that the Community and the
Member States were jointly competent to conclude the GATS.
The ECJ found that the exclusive competence of the Com-
munity regarding the TRIPs agreement was very restricted.
172. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
173. Meinhard Hilf, The ECJ's Opinion 1/94 on the WTO-No Surprise, but
Wise?, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 245, 258 (1995).
174. See Friedl Weiss, The General Agreement on Trade in Services 1994, 32
COMMON Mi'r. L. REv. 1177 (1995) (overview of the contents of GATS).
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But the Community was found to be exclusively competent to
conclude the parts of the TRIPs agreement relating to measures
against the international trade in counterfeit goods. Conse-
quently, the ECJ concluded that the Community and the Mem-
ber States were jointly competent to conclude the TRIPs
agreement.
B. ExPLIcrr AND IMPLICIT TREATY-MAKING POWER
In the WTO Opinion, the respective treaty-making powers
of the Council and the Commission of the EU were not at issue.
Rather, the issue was the treaty-making powers of the EC as a
whole compared to the individual Member States. Nevertheless,
the case indirectly resembles France v. Commission, where the
immediate question was whether the Commission or the Council
was the competent institution to conclude the treaty, and the
ultimate underlying issue was the struggle for power between
the EC, represented by the Commission, and the Member
States, represented by the Council.
The case law of the ECJ has considerably expanded the EC's
competence to conclude treaties with third countries and other
organizations. The EC Treaty contains express provisions con-
cerning the treaty-making power of the EC, primarily in Article
113 on the CCP. But the ECJ has found in addition that where
the EC has the power to regulate an issue internally, it also has
the implicit power to conclude treaties with third countries on
the same subject. 175 Where the implicit treaty-making power is
concerned, initially the Community and the Member States
have parallel treaty-making powers. Then, as soon as the EC
has laid down common internal EC rules on a subject, the com-
petence of the EC to conclude international agreements within
the same field becomes exclusive, and the Member States lose
their interim parallel treaty-making power.
The possible implicit exclusive treaty-making powers dis-
cussed in the WTO Opinion would flow, in the view of the opti-
mistic Commission, from the provisions of the EC Treaty
establishing the community's internal competence (relating to
services and transport); from existing community legislation giv-
ing effect to that internal competence; from the need to enter
into international commitments in order to achieve a specific in-
ternal objective; or finally, from the more general Articles 100a
175. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
518 [Vol. 6:473
BANANAS AND OTHER CuRREmT IssuEs
and 235.176 Article 100a of the EC Treaty deals with establish-
ment of the EC internal market (comprising the free movement
of goods, persons, services and capital). Article 235 states that,
where action by the Community is necessary to attain a Commu-
nity objective and the EC Treaty has not provided the necessary
powers, the Council shall nevertheless take appropriate meas-
ures. Article 235 functions as an "emergency exit" for the Com-
munity when measures are needed, but the legal basis for the
EC to undertake them is not provided in the EC Treaty.
It has already been established by the ECJ that Article 235
provides a legal basis for the EC to conclude treaties with third
countries in the exceptional case where the internal powers of
the EC can only be effectively exercised if combined with the
conclusion of a treaty with a third country or countries.177 We
will see below the respective roles of the EC's explicit treaty-
making powers under Article 113 and implicit treaty-making
powers under Article 100a and Article 235 as they relate to the
EC's competence to conclude the WTO agreements.
C. THE COMPETENCE TO CONCLUDE THE MULTLATERAL
AGREEMENTS ON TRADE IN GOODS
A relatively easy question for the ECJ to answer in the WTO
Opinion was whether the Community had exclusive competence
to conclude the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, in
so far as those agreements concern products within the scope of
the ECSC Treaty and products coming within the scope of the
Euratom Treaty. 178 It was obvious in the eyes of the Commis-
sion that the Community had exclusive competence to conclude
the agreements concerning products other than the ones covered
by the ECSC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty, so the Commis-
sion did not raise that question. The Court found that the
Euratom Treaty does not contain any provisions relating to ex-
ternal trade and therefore nothing prevents treaties concluded
under Article 113 of the EC Treaty from extending to trade in
Euratom Treaty products. 179 So far as ECSC Treaty products
are concerned, the Commission claimed that these were also cov-
ered by the Community's exclusive competence to conclude trea-
176. Opinion 1/94, supra note 165, 72.
177. Opinion 1/76, supra note 50. See, e.g., Council Decision 75/437 on the
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources,
1975 O.J. (L 194) 5 (concluded under Article 235).
178. Opinion 1/94, supra note 165, 22-34.
179. Id. 24.
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ties. The Council and the Member States claimed that the
Member States hold exclusive competence to conclude treaties
relating to coal and steel products. 180
Article 71 of the ECSC Treaty provides that "[t]he powers of
the Governments of Member States in matters of commercial
policy shall not be affected by this Treaty, save as otherwise pro-
vided therein."181 Article 232(1) of the EC Treaty provides that
the EC Treaty shall not affect the provisions of the treaty estab-
lishing the ECSC, particularly regarding the rights and obliga-
tions of Member States or the powers of the institutions of that
Community. This would seem to mean that the individual Mem-
ber States have kept their treaty-making powers respecting
trade in coal and steel products.
The ECJ stated, however, that Article 71 of the ECSC
Treaty only reserved the treaty-making competence to the Mem-
ber States as regards agreements relating specifically to coal
and steel products and that the EC has the sole competence
under Article 113 to conclude external trade agreements of a
general nature, i.e. encompassing all types of goods, including
ECSC Treaty products.18 2 None of the Multilateral Agreements
on Trade in Goods relates specifically to ECSC Treaty products
and therefore it followed, according to the ECJ, that the exclu-
sive competence of the Community cannot be impugned on the
ground that they also apply to ECSC Treaty products.183
The Council also raised the question whether trade in agri-
cultural products was covered by Article 113.184 The Court
found that the conclusion of both the Agreement on Agriculture
and the related Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures could be based on Article 113.185 The ECJ determined
that the Community has exclusive competence pursuant to Arti-
cle 113 to conclude all the Multilateral Agreements on the Trade
in Goods.186
180. Id. 25.
181. ECSC TREATY art. 71.
182. Opinion 1/94, supra note 165, 27.
183. Id.
184. Id. 28.
185. Id. 9 28-31.
186. Id. 34.
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D. WHO SHOULD CONCLUDE THE GATS AND TRIPs
AGREEMENTS-THE EC OR THE MEMBER STATES?
The next important question considered by the ECJ was
whether the EC also had exclusive competence by virtue of Arti-
cle 113 to conclude GATS and TRIPs. As to GATS, the Commis-
sion pointed out that the ECJ, in its earlier case law, had
applied a non-restrictive interpretation to the concept of the
CCP in Article 113.187 Also, according to the Commission, in
certain developed countries, services have become the dominant
sector of the economy, and whereas basic industry is being
transferred to developing countries, the developed countries
have become exporters of services and goods with a high value-
added content.' 88 The ECJ pointed out that this trend was rec-
ognized in the WTO agreement and its annexes, since these
were negotiated together and included both goods and
services. 8 9
To see more specifically whether the international trade in
services can be included within the scope of Article 113, the
Court looked at the four different ways in which GATS classifies
the way services from one country are supplied to another. The
Court concluded that when the service is rendered by a supplier
established in one country to a consumer residing in another-
so-called cross-frontier supplies-the provision of the service can
be included under Article 113.190 This includes the banking, in-
surance, and telecommunications sectors. 191 The cross-frontier
supply situation is, in the words of the Court, not unlike trade in
goods, which is unquestionably within the meaning of the EC
Treaty.192 The Court held that there is no particular reason
why such a supply should not fall within the concept of the
CCP. 19 3
The Court's interpretation of the EC treaty is very interest-
ing, especially in comparison with the way treaty texts, includ-
187. See generaUlly Opinion 1175, Opinion of the Court given pursuant to Ar-
ticle 228 of the EEC Treaty of 11 November 1975, 1975 E.C.R. 1355; Opinion
178, Opinion of the Court of 4 October 1979 given pursuant to the second sub-
paragraph of Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, 1979 E.C.R. 2871 (two Advisory
Opinions of the ECJ).
188. Opinion 1/94, supra note 165, 40.
189. Id.
190. Id. 43-44. See also Case C-360/93, European Parliament v. Council
of the European Union, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1209.
191. Id., Final Act, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex on Fi-
nancial Services, at 1189; Annex on Telecommunications, at 1192.
192. Opinion 194, supra note 165, 44.
193. Id.
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ing the EC Treaty, are normally interpreted. The Court took the
approach that there was no reason why the EC Treaty should
not be interpreted in a particular way. This makes it seem as if
there is a presumption in favor of an expansive interpretation of
the EC Treaty. On the other hand, the other three modes of sup-
ply of services covered by GATS-consumption abroad, commer-
cial presence, and the presence of natural persons-are not to be
included under Article 113.194
The Court also considers the issue of transport services.
Since these are the subject of a specific title in the EC Treaty on
transport-distinct from the title on the CCP-the ECJ dealt
with them separately. Referring to its earlier case law, the
Court clearly stated that all international agreements concluded
in the field of transport were excluded from Article 113.195
The Commission, which argued that international agree-
ments in the field of transport were indeed included under Arti-
cle 113, invoked a number of embargoes decided by the Council
based on Article 113 and involving the suspension of transport
services. 196 In an interesting parallel to its reasoning in France
v. Commission, the Court stated that a mere practice of the
Council cannot derogate from the rules laid down in the EC
Treaty; therefore it cannot create a binding precedent regarding
the correct legal basis for a particular measure.197 This is the
very issue of the WTO Opinion.
194. Id. 45.
195. Id. 1 53; see ERTA, supra note 50; Opinion 1/76, supra note 50 (cases
referred to by the Court to prove its point); cf. Joined Cases 3,4, & 6/76, supra
note 50.
196. Opinion 1194, supra note 165, 1 51.
197. Id. 52. Jacques Bourgeois, discussing what he refers to as the incon-
sistencies of the reasoning in the WTO Opinion, points out that the ECJ some-
times takes previous practice into consideration and sometimes not. Jacques
Bourgeois, The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: An Echternach
Procession, 32 CoMMoN MKT. L. REV. 763, 777-78. In France v. Commission the
issue was the interpretation of the expression "powers vested in the Commis-
sion" in Article 228(2) in the EC Treaty, not the correct legal basis as such,
which was not disputed. See supra note 17. Hilf argues that the Court, in the
WTO Opinion, "confirms the doctrine which negates the existence of any cus-
tomary Community law as it is always the ECJ which in the last resort has the
power and responsibility to conclusively define the extent of EC competences."
Hilf, supra note 173, at 257-58. Against this it can be argued that since the EC
Treaty is (as yet) an international treaty and not a national constitution it is
not the ECJ but the Member States who ultimately set the limits to EC compe-
tences, and that the applicable rules of interpretation are the ones contained in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (of 1969), not the ones concern-
ing the interpretation of national constitutions.
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As to TRIPs, the ECJ considered whether provisions of the
TRIPs agreement can be based on Article 113, and thus deprive
the Member States of treaty-making power in this field. The
Court soon reached the conclusion that the Community is exclu-
sively competent to conclude international agreements only in
matters regarding the release of counterfeit goods into free cir-
culation. 198 This is because measures against the release into
free circulation within the EC of counterfeit goods relate to
measures to be taken by customs authorities at the external
frontiers of the Community. 199 The Community can decide
these kinds of measures autonomously on the basis of Article
113. Therefore, the Court held, the Community is exclusively
competent to conclude international agreements on such
matters.200
The Court used several arguments to explain why Article
113 could not control the rest of the TRIPs agreement. First, the
Court stated that intellectual property rights do not relate spe-
cifically to international trade, which would bring them within
the scope of Article 113. Rather, they affect internal trade just
as much as international trade. 20 1 Second, the Court referred to
the fact that, even though the Community is competent to legis-
late internally in the field of intellectual property under Articles
100 and 100a of the EC Treaty on the internal market 20 2 and
under Article 235 on "extra-EC Treaty" measures, its internal
competence is subject to voting rules and rules of procedure.
These rules do not apply to the competence of the Community to
conclude international treaties under Article 113. 2 03 For in-
stance, decisions have to be taken unanimously by the Council
under Articles 100 and 235, whereas decisions under Article 113
are taken by qualified majority voting. Furthermore, in the
198. Opinion 1/94, supra note 165, 55-56.
199. Id. 55.
200. Id.
201. Id. 57. Bourgeois criticizes the ECJ for inconsistently applying this
criterion (that internal trade is concerned just as much as international trade)
for defining the scope of the common commercial policy: "[I]f this were a rele-
vant criterion to define the scope of the Common Commercial Policy, quite a few
other matters, such as the Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Meas-
ures and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, would be
excluded from the scope of Article 113." Bourgeois, supra note 197, at 777. The
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade would also fall outside Article 113 if
this criterion were applied consistently. Id.
202. Article 100a, along with many other articles, was inserted in the EC
Treaty through the Single European Act concluded in 1987. Article 100a was
designed to speed up the creation of a fully integrated common EC market.
203. Opinion 1/94, supra note 165, 1 59.
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cases of Articles 100, 100a and Article 235, the European Parlia-
ment is also involved in decision-making. This is not the case
under Article 113.
The Court pointed out that exclusive competence of the
Community to enter into international agreements implying the
harmonization of the protection of intellectual property would
mean that the Community institutions would be able to escape
the internal constraints just mentioned. 20 4  Again,
"i]nstitutional practice in relation to autonomous measures or
external agreements adopted on the basis of Article 113 cannot
alter this conclusion."20 5 Although the ECJ conceded that the
Community has concluded (under Article 113) bilateral trade
treaties which have included clauses relating to intellectual
property rights, the ECJ held that those clauses were limited in
scope and merely ancillary to the treaties as a whole. 20 6 In the
words of the Court, this means that the Community does not
have exclusive competence to conclude an international agree-
ment of the type and scope of TRIPs.207
The Commission also argued that, in case the ECJ would
not recognize that the Community held exclusive competence to
conclude the GATS or TRIPs agreement under Article 113, com-
petence would flow implicitly from the provisions in the EC
Treaty establishing the Community's internal competence to
legislate, or else from the more general Articles 100a and 235
mentioned earlier.208 The Commission, being well acquainted
with the ECJ's earlier case law, also invoked the existence of
internal legislation and the need to enter into international com-
mitments to achieve an internal Community objective as alter-
native bases for exclusive Community treaty-making
competence concerning the GATS and TRIPs.209
The Court rejected these arguments for exclusive Commu-
nity competence. The Court's basic counter-argument was a rel-
atively simple one derived from earlier case law: the external
competence of the Community does not become exclusive until
204. Id. 91 60. Bourgeois remarks that this institutional consideration prob-
ably implicitly played a role in the Court's reasoning on other points in the
judgment. Bourgeois, supra note 197, at 783.
205. Opinion 1/94, supra note 165, 91 61.
206. Id. 9 66-68.
207. Id. 91 68.
208. Id. 72; see Part IV.B (discussing explicit and implicit treaty-making
power).
209. Opinion 1/94, supra note 165, 91 72.
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and unless its internal competence has been excercised in the
form of the adoption of internal legislation of some kind.210
With regard to the TRIPs, the Court rejected the Commis-
sion's argument that the exclusive competence of the Commu-
nity could be derived from the need to enter into an
international commitment (i.e. the TRIPs) in order to achieve an
internal Community objective. The Court simply held that
achieving unification or harmonization of intellectual property
rights within the Community does not necessarily have to be ac-
companied by the conclusion of an international agreement with
third countries. 211 In relation to the GATS, the Court used the
similarly narrow formula not inextricably linked.212
As far as the existence of internal Community legislation is
concerned, the Court pointed out that the only Community Acts
adopted so far in the field of intellectual property rights con-
cerned the harmonization of laws relating to trademarks and
measures to prohibit the release of counterfeit goods for free cir-
culation in the Community.213 The latter piece of legislation is
based on Article 113 of the E.C. Treaty, and thus the correspond-
ing treaty-making power of the Community is exclusive. In ad-
dition to the two areas just indicated, TRIPs covers many other
areas also relating to the protection of intellectual property in
which there is no Community legislation. There has been only
partial harmonization of Community rules in this field, in the
words of the ECJ.214 In relation to GATS, the Court similarly
points out that there has been no complete harmonization of
rules in all service sectors within the community.215 From this
follows, according to the Court, that the Community could not be
exclusively competent to conclude treaties either in the field of
intellectual property rights or in the field of services.
The ECJ found that the Community and the Member States
were jointly competent to conclude the TRIPs agreement.216 In
the case of the GATS, as we saw above, the Court found that so
far as certain parts of GATS are concerned, dealing with the
cross-frontier supplies of services not involving any movement of
persons, the Community is exclusively competent to conclude
210. Cf ERTA, supra note 50.
211. Opinion 1194, supra note 165, 100.
212. Id. 86.
213. Id. 9 55, 103-104; Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L40) 1; Council
Regulation 3842/86, 1987 O.J. (L 33) 18.
214. Opinion 1/94, supra note 165, 103.
215. Id. 96-97.
216. Id. 105 and conclusion of the Court.
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the GATS under Article 113 on the CCP. Concerning the re-
maining parts of the GATS, the ECJ found that the Community
did not benefit either from its exclusive competence under Arti-
cle 113 or from any exclusive implied treaty-making powers.
The only remaining possibility was that the Member States re-
tained their own national treaty-making competence in those ar-
eas. Thus the Court found that the Community and the Member
States were jointly competent to conclude the GATS as well.217
In respect to both the GATS and the TRIPs agreement, the ECJ
applied a restrictive interpretation of its own doctrine on the im-
plied treaty-making powers of the Community.2 18
E. THE DuTy OF COOPERATION
After concluding that the Community and the Member
States are jointly competent to conclude both the GATS and the
TRIPs agreement, meaning that the Community can only con-
clude parts of the agreements and the Member States must con-
clude the rest, the Court discussed the duty of cooperation
between the Member States and the Community. The Commis-
sion pointed to administrative problems which would arise with
the joint participation of the Community and the Member States
in the GATS and TRIPs agreements. In matters within the com-
petence of individual Member States, the consensus rule ap-
plies. In matters within the competence of the Community,
Community procedures will apply, which in this case means the
rule of qualified majority. 219 Also, the Commission, probably re-
alistically, feared that the issue would often arise whether a
given matter fell within the competence of the Community or
within that of the Member States. If this question arose, the
217. Opinion 1194, supra note 165, 98.
218. Bourgeois calls the WTO Opinion a "step back." Bourgeois, supra note
197, at 780-82. The restrictive interpretation was confirmed in Opinion 2/92,
1995 E.C.R. 1-521 (Competence of the Community or one of its institutions to
participate in the Third Revised Decision of the OECD on national treatment).
As concerns the direct effect of the WTO and annexed agreements within the
EC/EU, the Council stated explicitly in the preamble to its decision to conclude
the WTO agreement that the WTO and annexed agreements would not have
direct effect in Community or Member State courts. Council Decision 94/800,
1994 O.J. (L 336) 1. The last resort is for the ECJ to decide, but the Court,
based on its own case law on GATT, would seem to agree with the Council, and
yet the Court probably also shares the same view as the Parliament and the
Commission. As Pieter Kuijper writes, the ECJ is bound to take these views
into account when taking any decision on this matter. Kuijper, supra note 13,
at 236.
219. Opinion 1194, supra note 165, 106.
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Community's unity of action and negotiating power vis-d-vis the
rest of the world would be significantly weakened. 220
The Court held, however, that the many problems which
may arise in the implementation of the WTO Agreement and its
annexes cannot affect the prior isssue of whether the EC or the
Member States is competent to conclude the different trea-
ties.221 Competence is one thing, and administration is another.
On the other hand, the Court stressed the duty of cooperation
existing between the Community and the Member States in ful-
filling commitments when the subject-matter falls partly within
the competence of the Community and partly within the compe-
tence of individual Member States.222 The Court, however, did
not elaborate on how cooperation should be enforced. 223
In the case of the WTO agreements, the problem of coopera-
tion between the Community and the Member States is particu-
larly acute. Cross-retaliation measures, which are foreseen as
an important sanction against a party who violates one of the
treaties, may have to be implemented against either the Com-
munity or the Member States. This may be in a field in which
the entity is not itself competent-i.e. it may be necessary for
the Community to impose sanctions in a field in which it does
not have the powers to act (and therefore in practice cannot take
the necessary sanctions), or vice versa.224 Under the WTO
scheme, if a party has violated its obligations under a given
agreement, others may suspend their obligations under another
agreement vis-a-vis that WTO member. As stated by the Court,
220. Id.
221. Id. 107.
222. Id. 108; Opinion 178, supra note 187; Opinion 2/91, Opinion deliv-
ered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty,
1993 E.C.R. 1-1061 (cases providing legal basis for the duty to cooperate). The
Court could also have referred to the general principle of mutual loyalty (deriv-
ing from Article 5 of the EC Treaty) and that of external coherence relevant to
all activities under the umbrella of the EU. See TEU, supra note 1, arts. A, C;
see generally id. art. J(1) (on the common foreign and security policy); id. art.
K(5) (on cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs). Hill, supra note
173, at 256.
223. See Editorial Comment, The Aftermath of Opinion 1/94 or How to En-
sure Unity of Representation for Joint Competences, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
385 (1995). See also Nanette A. Neuwahl, Shared Power or Combined Incompe-
tence? More on mixity, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 667 (1996); Kuiper, supra note
13, at 243-44 (discussing two modes of implementing the duty of cooperation,
one treaty-based and the other informal, and concluding that the Member
States, the Commission and the Council will probably choose the informal mode
of cooperation); MIXED AGREEMENTS (David OKeefe & Henry G. Schermers eds.,
1983).
224. Opinion 1/94, supra note 165, 109.
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however, if an EC Member State, duly authorized within its
sphere of competence to take cross-retaliation measures, for rea-
sons of effectiveness would want to retaliate in the area of trade
in goods instead, it would not be empowered to do so. 225 The
same principle would apply if the Community would want to re-
taliate, not in the sector of goods, but in the areas covered by the
GATS or the TRIPs agreement. 226 It appears that this internal
division of competences on the European side will probably lead
to trouble.227 There is room for optimism, though, since all EC
Member States realize the importance of the EC's bargaining
power and "none could have an interest in undermining this
power by refusing the required cooperation."228
F. GATT, WTO, AND BANANAS: ANOTHER ADVISORY OPINION
In another attempt to attack the Banana Regulation,229
Germany requested an Advisory Opinion from the ECJ on the
compatibility of the Framework Agreement on Banana Im-
ports230 with the EC Treaty.231 Opinion 3/94 ties the Banana
Case and the WTO Opinion together in that the Framework
Agreement was one of the many agreements annexed to the
WTO agreement. According to the ECJ, the Framework Agree-
ment is an integral part of the agreements resulting from the
Uruguay Round.232 Thus, when the EC expressed its consent to
be bound by the agreement on the WTO and annexed agree-
ments on 22 December 1994, it also ratified the Framework
Agreement on Banana Imports. At that point in time, Germany
had requested an Advisory Opinion, but the Court had not yet
issued one.233
The Court eventually dismissed the German request for an
Advisory Opinion, because ratification had already taken place
before the Court announced a decision. Thus, the request no
longer had any object, in the Court's view, because an interna-
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. However, this division does not affect the possibilities of cross-retalia-
tion measures by third contracting parties.
228. Hilf, supra note 173, at 256.
229. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
231. Opinion 3/94, supra note 161. Afterwards, Germany brought an action
before the ECJ under Article 173(2) of the EC Treaty challenging the legality of
the Council decision to conclude the agreement. 1995 O.J. (C-122/95) 3.
232. Opinion 3/94, supra note 161, 8.
233. Germany submitted its request on July 25, 1994, before the EC ratified
the WTO agreements.
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tional agreement must be "envisaged" if the Court shall have the
right to pronounce on the legality of the agreement and, by
definition, an agreement already concluded cannot be
"envisaged."234
Moreover, the Court found it legally pointless to pronounce
on an agreement already concluded. If the ECJ found that a
planned agreement is contrary to the EC Treaty, but if the polit-
ical institutions of the EC still wanted to conclude the agree-
ment, the only available "sanction" would be to amend the EC
Treaty. This would involve the cumbersome process of ratifica-
tion of the agreement by all the Member States, rather than rat-
ification by the Council.235 If the Court found post factum that
an agreement was in fact contrary to the EC Treaty, the finding
would have no legal effect and would conflict with the internal
logic of Article 228(6). Conclusion of the agreement would al-
ready irrevocably have taken place, and it would not be possible
to apply the procedures of ratification by the Member States
afterward. 236
These arguments of the Court seem irreproachable from a
strictly logical point of view. But this makes application of Arti-
cle 228(6) dependent upon how long it takes the ECJ to handle a
request for an Opinion. If it takes a long time, chances are that
the agreement will already have been concluded when the Court
is ready to pronounce on the case, just as occurred in Opinion
3/94.237 Also, it seems that the EC would be able to adopt any
agreements and thus circumvent the more complicated proce-
dures for ratification by acting quickly-i.e. before the ECJ
would have had the chance to declare the agreement illegal
under the EC Treaty. The ECJ said in its own defense that, in-
stead of asking for an Advisory Opinion, there is always the al-
ternative of launching a complaint against the legality of the
234. Opinion 3/94, supra note 161, 23. According to the EC Treaty, "The
Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain the opinion of the
Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the
provisions of this Treaty." EC TREATY art. 228(6) (emphasis added). "Envis-
aged" in Article 228(6) means that while the EC is planning to conclude an
international agreement, the ECJ may pronounce on the compatibility of the
agreement with the EC Treaty.
235. EC TREATY art. 228(6); TEU, supra note 1, art. N.
236. Opinion 3/94, supra note 161, 13.
237. Id. 2. In the case of the WTO Opinion, the Court received the request
for an Opinion from the Commission on April 6, 1994, and issued its Opinion on
November 15. As to the German request for an Opinion, it was handed in on
July 25, 1994, and answered on December 13, 1995; it took more than twice as
long for the Court to answer the much simpler second request.
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decision whereby the Council ratifies a treaty, and in connection
with such a complaint asking the Court to take interim meas-
ures to stop the ratification process. 238
Germany had argued that the relevant time in question was
when the request for an Advisory Opinion was made-i.e. the
time when the Framework Agreement was undisputably still
planned and not yet concluded-not when the Court delivered
its Opinion. It is not clear from Opinion 3/94 why Germany did
not also bring an action for the annulment of the decision
whereby the Council ratified the WTO and annexed agreements.
Perhaps Germany thought that the request for an Advisory
Opinion which had already been launched would be enough. 23 9
The real reason why the ECJ dismissed the German request
for an Advisory Opinion on the Framework Agreement was
probably that the rules on imports of bananas to the EC had
already been thoroughly evaluated by the Court in the Banana
Case. Presumably, these rules were the real, albeit indirect, ob-
ject of Germany's request for an Advisory Opinion on the Frame-
work Agreement, even though most of the German criticisms
had to do with formalities of the intra-Community procedure for
negotiating and concluding the Agreement. In fact, the German
argument seems somewhat strained, as if Germany were trying
any and all means to stop the new common organization of the
banana market.
The ECJ may have suspected that Germany's primary con-
cern was not that the Framework Agreement would violate the
EC Treaty but that the Framework Agreement (and the Banana
Regulation) were contrary to Germany's economic interests.
The Court stated that the point of Advisory Opinions on planned
international agreements is to prevent problems which would
arise if the Community entered into agreements which turned
out to be contrary to the EC Treaty; the purpose is not to protect
the interests or rights of the Member State or institution re-
questing the Opinion. 240
238. Id. 1 22. Complaints in order to obtain the annulment of the act were
launched by France and Germany in the first two cases discussed in this article.
France was successful, but Germany was not.
239. See supra note 162 (the new complaint launched by Germany).
240. Opinion 3/94, supra note 161, 1 21. Everling argues against this state-
ment and says that the same difficulties which the Court claims would arise if
the Court found in an Advisory Opinion post factum that an agreement was
contrary to the EC Treaty would also arise if the Court post factum annulled
the decision by which the Council concluded the agreement. Everling also does
not accept the argument of the Court concerning the objectives of Advisory
opinions on the ground that it does not correspond to the constitutional position
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Another possible reason that the ECJ dismissed the Ger-
man request is that revising the Framework Agreement would
most certainly cause a number of serious practical, economic,
political, and legal problems. The Court simply may not have
been willing to risk such consequences by pronouncing on the
substance of the request for an Opinion. When the Uruguay
Round of negotiations finally had come to a successful conclu-
sion, the Court probably did not want to threaten the precarious
balance that had been achieved.
CONCLUSION
In France v. Commission,24 1 the ECJ agreed with French
criticisms that the Commission, on behalf of the EC, had con-
cluded an agreement on competition with the United States.
The French Government was obviously afraid that the Commis-
sion, and thereby the Community, would take on more tasks
than absolutely necessary. The Court upheld the French claims
and once again indicated indirectly that its decisions are becom-
ing considerably less favourable to the Community than they
once were. The WTO Opinion242 on the Uruguay Round treaties
confirms this new cautiousness by the ECJ. The result in the
WTO Opinion was the unwieldy arrangement whereby the EC is
a party to the agreements on trade in goods, whereas the EC
and the Member States individually are parties to the agree-
ments on services and intellectual property rights. The tug-of-
war between the Member States and the Community was again
felt, and the Court sided with the Member States rather than
with the EC.
This may be considered a good judicial policy or a bad one,
and it may be based on a number of different rationales. The
ECJ, which in the end is largely dependent on the Member
States, may not dare to defy their desire to keep as much power
to themselves for as long as possible. It may even be counter-
productive for the Court to be too defiant; if the Member States
find the Court too active in judicial policy-making, they may
choose to ignore its decisions completely. After some decades of
activism, perhaps the time has come for the Court to retreat
of the Member States within the EC as "amici curiae" with an unconditional
right, as confirmed in Article 173(2), to appeal to the ECJ to guard the legality
of Community law, including agreements with third countries. Everling, supra
note 104, at 422, 428.
241. See supra note 10.
242. See supra note 165.
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somewhat and content itself with applying the law, rather than
making law and taking upon itself the task of pushing European
integration forward.243
The Banana Case244 shows, however, that even if the Com-
munity tends to lose in a conflict between the Community and
the EC Member States, the ECJ does not hesitate to protect the
interests of the Community if they come into conflict with other
interests in a global context. This is especially true if what is at
stake is the EC's protectionist common agricultural policy con-
fronted with the international free-trade challenges of the
GATT. Instead of being cautious, one could argue that the ECJ
went too far in its integrationist zeal in the Banana Case.2 45
The dominant trend toward more cooperation by the Mem-
ber States and relatively less by the EC proper was evident al-
ready in the Maastricht Treaty with its emphasis on inter-
governmental cooperation. As for the ECJ, the new cautious-
ness has made itself felt in the field of competition law246 and in
the law on the free intra-European movement of goods. 247 It is
still too early to state anything concerning the outcome of the
ongoing revision of the TEU 248 as to the balance of power be-
tween the Member States and the Community.
243. Cf Andrea Appella, Constitutional aspects of Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ
concerning the WTO agreement, 45 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 453, 459-460 (1996);
Hilf, supra note 173, at 245-246, 255, 258.
244. See supra note 57.
245. Cf Everling, supra note 104, at 436.
246. See generally Case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v. Henniger Briu, 1991
E.C.R. 1-935 (an earlier significant case).
247. See generally Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, Bernard Keck and Daniel
Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097 (a landmark case).
248. The Intergovernmental Conference began in March 1996.
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